





The Freedom Theatre/Bus: 





Submitted by Jack William Anthony Reeves 
to the University of Exeter as a dissertation for the degree of 







This dissertation is available for Library use on the understanding that it is 
copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published 
without proper acknowledgement. 
 
 
I certify that all material in this dissertation which is not my own work has been 
identified and that any material that has previously been submitted and 










In the Spring of 2021, Israel launched another assault on Gaza, during 
which it destroyed the al-Jalaa tower. Housing international news media outlets, 
the action was decried as an attempt to control the narrative, and not the first 
time Israel had done so. Edward Said published the article ‘Permission to 
Narrate’ during the 1982 Lebanon War, laying bare the need for a commitment 
to a national Palestinian narrative. Almost forty years later, the opposing 
narratives to the Israeli-Palestinian discourse are well-documented. However, it 
is not simply the case that Palestinians are now speaking up. Under the Israeli 
occupation, narration is not a simple task, and it is important to understand the 
obstacles facing Palestinian narrators, especially in a twenty-first century 
context. One activist group attempting to narrate the Palestinian experience is 
the Freedom Theatre, in the West Bank. Tracing its origins back to the First 
Intifada, it was created in 2006 as a centre for cultural resistance in the wake of 
the violence of the Second Intifada. It adhered to a concept called the “Cultural 
Intifada” – a dual challenge to the Israeli occupation and a restatement of 
Palestinian culture. The Theatre drew both support and criticism, coming to a 
head with the assassination of its director, Juliano Mer Khamis. As the Theatre 
grew, it launched the Freedom Bus in 2011. The Bus travelled to communities 
in the West Bank, carrying out playback theatre performances. At the same 
time, through its online platforms, it created a narrative aimed at an international 
audience. The Freedom Theatre and Bus faced challenges to their narration, as 
they acted within the confines of the Israeli occupation and the accompanying 
reality on the ground. Through their efforts, it is possible not only to delineate a 
Palestinian narrative – to see the “permission to narrate” in action – but to gain 
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On the 15th May 2021, Israel destroyed the al-Jalaa tower in Gaza City.1 
Israel had launched an assault on the city five days earlier – “Operation 
Guardian of the Walls” – after a series of confrontations between Israelis and 
Palestinians.2 The results were 248 Palestinians, including 66 children, dead, 
with 1900 wounded, and one Israeli soldier and 12 Israeli civilians, including two 
children, dead.3 The collapse of al-Jalaa came amidst the destruction of Gaza 
wrought by Israeli airstrikes. Whilst claiming to be targeting Palestinian military 
positions, Israel has often taken its operations in Gaza as opportunities to 
damage Palestinian infrastructure and attempt to force submission from the 
Palestinian populace.4 Although Israel claimed al-Jalaa contained Hamas 
intelligence assets – a standard justification – the tower was home to 
international media offices including al-Jazeera, the Associated Press and 
Middle East Eye.5 The destruction of the building was condemned as an overt 
attempt to silence those covering the military offensive – and was not the first 
time Israel had used force to control international narratives about its 
 
1 Al Jazeera, ‘Gaza Tower Housing Al Jazeera Office Destroyed by Israeli Attack’, al-Jazeera, 
15th May 2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/15/building-housing-al-jazeeera-office-
in-gaza-hit-by-israeli-strike> [Accessed 23rd June 2021]. 
2 Patrick Kingsley, ‘After Years of Quiet, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Exploded. Why Now?’, New 
York Times, 7th June 2021, <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/15/world/middleeast/israel-
palestinian-gaza-war.html> [Accessed 21st June 2021]; Judah Ari Gross, ‘IDF: Efforts Against 
Hamas to be Known as “Operation Guardians of the Walls”’, Times of Israel, 11th May 2021, 
<https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/idf-efforts-against-hamas-to-be-known-as-
operation-guardian-of-the-walls/> [Accessed 23rd June 2021]. 
3 Al Jazeera and News Agencies, ‘Gaza: Daunting Rebuilding Task after 11 Days of Israeli 
Bombing’, al-Jazeera, 21st May 2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/21/thousands-
of-gazans-return-to-destroyed-homes-after-israel-truce> [Accessed 23rd June 2021]. 
4 Noam Chomsky and Ilan Pappé, On Palestine (London: Penguin Books, 2015), pp.145-146 
and 155; Ola Mousa, ‘How Israel Tried to Put Gaza Out of Business’, Electronic Intifada, 17th 
June 2021, <https://electronicintifada.net/content/how-israel-tried-put-gaza-out-
business/33431> [Accessed 23rd June 2021]. 
5 Al Jazeera, ‘Gaza Tower Housing Al Jazeera Destroyed by Israeli Attack’; Dania Akkad, 
‘Israel’s War on Gaza: Was Hamas Really Operating Out of the Al-Jalaa Building?’, Middle East 
Eye, 24th May 2021, <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/hamas-claims-gaza-israel-army-
bombing-jalaa> [Accessed 23rd June 2021]. 
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relationship with Palestine.6 During the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon – a 
conflict fundamentally intended to quash Palestinian nationalism – Edward Said 
published an article titled ‘Permission to Narrate,’ writing that despite “having 
made a strong impression regionally and internationally during the years 1970 
to 1982, the Palestinian narrative . . . is now barely in evidence,” with the 
Palestinian narrative never properly recognised by Israel or its supporters.7 
Instead, the Palestinians were made “‘non-Jews,’ whose inert presence in 
Palestine was a nuisance to be ignored or expelled.”8 Palestinians are up 
against a “wilderness of mirrors” that allows Israel to control the Conflict’s 
narrative and maintain its dominance.9 Said’s emphasis laid bare the need for a 
communal and collective commitment to a national narrative in order to make 
the Palestinian experience unignorable.10 
Palestinians and their supporters are attempting to narrate their own history and 
experience. Attitudes towards the Israel-Palestinian Conflict are changing, 
especially on social media and amongst the populaces of Israel’s key Western 
supporters, with rising awareness of and sympathy for the Palestinian cause – 
despite an apparent, continuing rigidity in the “peace process” status quo – and 
this is, in no small part, thanks to the work of Palestinian activists and 
narrators.11 It is not, however, simply a case of Palestinians now speaking up. 
 
6 Al Jazeera, ‘“Silence the Story”: Israeli Bombing of Media Offices Condemned’, al-Jazeera, 
15th May 2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/15/silence-the-story-israeli-strike-on-
media-offices-gaza-condemned> [Accessed 24th June 2021]; CPJ, ‘Israeli Air Strikes Destroy 
Buildings Housing more than a Dozen Media Outlets in Gaza’, Committee to Protect Journalists, 
13th May 2021, <https://cpj.org/2021/05/israeli-air-strikes-destroy-buildings-housing-more-than-
a-dozen-media-outlets-in-gaza/> [Accessed 24th June 2021]. 
7 Edward Said, ‘Permission to Narrate’, Journal of Palestine Studies, 13.3 (1984), 27-48, pp.31-
33; Rashid Khalidi, The Hundred Years’ War on Palestine: A History of Settler Colonial 
Conquest and Resistance (London: Profile Books, 2020), p.142. 
8 Said, ‘Permission to Narrate’, pp.31-33 
9 Said, ‘Permission to Narrate’, p.37. 
10 Said, ‘Permission to Narrate’, p.47. 
11 Anchal Vohra, ‘Israel Losing US Perception Battle as Palestinian Sympathy Grows’, al-
Jazeera, 1st June 2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/1/israel-losing-us-perception-
battle-as-palestinians-sympathy-grows> [Accessed 25th June 2021]; Sanya Mansoor, ‘How 
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Against a regime that actively seeks their silence and disappearance, under an 
oppressive system, narration is not a simple task, and it is important to 
understand the obstacles facing a Palestinian narrator. It is therefore crucial to 
not only analyse Palestinian narratives in relation to their Israeli counterpart, as 
part of a simple narrative discourse, but to explore the implicit and explicit, and 
external and internal, challenges to Palestinian narration. In moments of greater 
intensity, such as with the 2021 assault and al-Jalaa tower, the tangible 
limitations imposed are clear; however, the Israeli occupation is a continuous 
and systematic process, and the difficulties in forming and sharing a Palestinian 
narrative are not always recognised. 
 One such group attempting to narrate the Palestinian experience is the 
Freedom Theatre in Jenin, the West Bank. The Freedom Theatre traces its 
origins back to the First Intifada, as Israeli activist Arna Mer Khamis created a 
theatre school for Palestinian children. Mer Khamis’ son, Juliano Mer Khamis, 
then continued her legacy, creating the Freedom Theatre in 2006, in the wake 
of the Second Intifada. The Freedom Theatre was founded by Juliano, Zakaria 
Zubeidi – then leader of Jenin’s al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades militant group –  and 
Jonatan Stanczak, a Swedish activist; Mer Khamis would act as artistic director 
and Stanczak as operations manager, whilst Zubeidi would use his influence in 
Jenin to provide legitimacy.12 It is supported, both financially and through other 
 
Online Activism and the Racial Reckoning in the U.S. have Helped Drive a Groundswell of 
Support for Palestinians’, TIME, 21st May 2021, <https://time.com/6050422/pro-palestinian-
support/> [Accessed 17th September 2021]; TRT World News, ‘Is Israel Losing its Influence over 
Western Audiences?’, TRTWorld, 17th May 2021, <https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/is-israel-
losing-its-influence-over-western-audiences-46770> [Accessed 17th September 2021]; United 
Nations, ‘There is Urgent Need to Safeguard Global Consensus around Question of Palestine, 
Permanent Observer Stresses, as Palestinian Rights Committee Meets’, GA/PAL/1425, 4th 
September 2019, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/gapal1425.doc.htm> [Accessed 17th 
September 2021]. 
12 Johanna Wallin and Jonatan Stanczak, ‘The Beginning’ in The Freedom Theatre: Performing 
Cultural Resistance in Palestine, ed. by Ola Johansson and Johanna Wallin (New Delhi: 
Leftword, 2018), 28-45, pp.28-35. 
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means, by various foundations, organisations and individuals, as well as by a 
number of “Friends Associations” that aid in fundraising and networking.13 The 
Theatre adhered to a concept it formed itself called the “Cultural Intifada” – a 
dual challenge to the Israeli occupation and a restatement of Palestinian culture 
– and held productions intended to highlight issues both with Israel, and 
Palestinian political and societal norms. The actions of the Theatre drew both 
support and criticism in Israel and Palestine, coming to a head with the 
assassination of Juliano Mer Khamis in 2011. 
As the Freedom Theatre grew, it extended its reach, creating programmes 
including the Freedom Bus in late-2011, as a means of magnifying its impact 
within broader political activities.14 The Freedom Bus initiative was co-founded 
by Ben Rivers, an Australian playback theatre practitioner, who remained 
involved as a researcher, facilitator and trainer.15 Between 2012 and 2016, the 
Bus travelled from community to community in the West Bank, working to aid 
those Palestinians they visited with their bespoke problems and rounding-off the 
visits with a playback theatre performance. During these performances, the 
Freedom Bus would take testimonies provided by the audience and recreate 
them on stage. Alongside these Rides, as the Bus termed them, the activists 
maintained online platforms – centred around a blog – to share their own 
experiences, and the lived realities and personal testimonies of the Palestinians 
they visited with an international audience. The Freedom Bus has received 
endorsements from the likes of Alice Walker, Angela Davis, John Berger, Judith 
 
13 The Freedom Theatre, ‘Friends & Supporters’, The Freedom Theatre (No date) 
<https://www.thefreedomtheatre.org/friends-supporters/> [Accessed 17th September 2021]; 
Wallin and Stanczak, ‘The Beginning’, pp.32-38. 
14 Ben Rivers, ‘Narrative Power: Playback Theatre as Cultural Resistance in Occupied 
Palestine’ in The Freedom Theatre: Performing Cultural Resistance in Palestine, ed. by Ola 
Johansson and Johanna Wallin (New Delhi: LeftWord, 2018), 305-339, p.307. 
15 Rivers, ‘Narrative Power’, pp.307-308. 
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Butler, Luisa Morgantini, Maya Angelou, Mairead Maguire, Mazin Qumsiyeh, 
Noam Chomsky, Omar Barghouti and Peter Brook, and is endorsed by the 
Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions National Committee.16 Its stated aims are to 
use “interactive theatre and cultural activism to bear witness, raise awareness 
and build alliances throughout occupied Palestine and beyond.”17 Narrative 
becomes the vehicle through which these aims are realised and 
communicated.18 The Freedom Theatre and Bus’ narrative largely focusses 
around the idea of cultural resistance – challenging the Israeli occupation both 
directly and by resisting the destruction of Palestinian culture through non-
violent means, although the Freedom Bus then shifted its focus more directly 
onto challenging Israel.19 
Both the Freedom Theatre and Bus highlight the discoursal and practical 
challenges in presenting a Palestinian narrative. As an organisation outside of 
the dominant Palestinian and Israeli authorities, the activists face challenges in 
entering, interacting with and navigating the dominant narrative discourse, and 
in overcoming their position as a lesser- or counter-narrative. Alongside this, the 
activists face physical barriers to their narration, as they act within the confines 
of the Israeli occupation and the accompanying reality on the ground. As such, 
through the Freedom Theatre and Bus, it is possible not only to delineate a 
Palestinian narrative – to see the “permission to narrate” in action – but to gain 
an insight into the nuances and realities of creating such a narrative. Rather 
than simply presenting the broader narrative discourse, or approaching the 
 
16 The Freedom Bus, ‘About’, Freedom Bus: Ride for Justice (No date) 
<https://freedombuspalestine.wordpress.com/about/> [Accessed 25th June 2021]. 
17 The Freedom Bus, ‘About’, Freedom Bus: Ride for Justice. 
18 Meg Jensen and Margaretta Jolly (eds.), We Shall Bear Witness: Life Narratives and Human 
Rights (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2014), p.14. 
19 Johanna Wallin and Jonatan Stanczak, ‘The Freedom Theatre’s Cultural Resistance’ in The 
Freedom Theatre: Performing Cultural Resistance in Palestine, ed. by Ola Johansson and 
Johanna Wallin (New Delhi: Leftword, 2018), 88-106, pp.88-90. 
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Freedom Theatre’s cultural resistance as a small facet of the Conflict, this thesis 
will bridge the gap and emphasise the interlinked significance of the two, as 
examples of practical action and theoretical discourse influencing each other in 
turn. In existing scholarship, the results of Palestinian narrators’ efforts – the 
narratives – have been analysed, but the efforts themselves – the narrations – 
have not been given the same level of attention. 
 
Understanding “Narrative” as a Framework 
 For the purposes of this thesis and in the context of the Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict, at the most-basic level, a “narrative” can be understood as 
a particular perspective of an event or a series of events, created through 
subjective interpretation. Narrative, in a historical or social science sense, is 
often tied to discussions of identity, ideology or nationalism, as means of 
justifying these constructs.20 Activism, whilst related to these constructs, 
presents another purpose through which to understand the creation of 
narratives. Moving beyond accepting “History” as a definitive, factual account of 
events allows us to use “narrative” to better understand who is interpreting 
these events, under what influences and for what purpose.21 Such a notion is 
especially clear in Israel-Palestine, as the two conflicting sides interpret the 
same shared history through widely different understandings that contradict one 
another and directly tie to each of their claims to the same land.22 In terms of 
 
20 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, 2nd Ed. (London: Verso, 2016); Landon E. Hancock (ed.), Narratives of Identity in 
Social Movements, Conflicts and Change (Bingley: Emerald Group, 2016); Homi K. Bhabha 
(ed.), Nation and Narration (London: Routledge, 1990). 
21 Hayden White, The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), pp.ix-xi; Alun Munslow, Narrative and 
History, 2nd Ed. (London: Red Globe Press, 2019). 
22 Ilan Pappé (ed.), The Israel/Palestine Question (London: Routledge, 1999); Raphael Israeli, 
Old Historians, New Historians, No Historians: The Derailed Debate on the Genesis of Israel 
11 
 
narrative “discourse” – the theoretical field in which these narratives interact and 
compete – the Israeli narrative exists as the “dominant” narrative – as it holds 
hegemony over the discourse, historically seeing greater power and support – 
and so the Palestinian narrative exists as something of a “counternarrative” – 
resulting from its distinctiveness and position as a challenge to the dominant 
narrative. 
Equally, however, presenting Israeli-Palestinian discourse as merely having the 
two sides is over-simplistic. Both sides – the Israelis and Palestinians – see 
further divides within their own narratives, as they – within themselves – see 
their own discourses. This is where the Freedom Theatre and Bus, as a case 
study, finds its relevance. Whilst the Freedom Theatre challenges Israel along 
much the same lines as the broader Palestinian narrative, it does so with a 
perspective that differs at times from the generalised Palestinian perspective 
seen in the overall Israeli-Palestinian discourse. As a result, the Freedom 
Theatre – in creating its own narrative of events somewhat distinct from the 
typical Palestinian narrative – also sees itself as a counternarrative within 
Palestinian discourse, agreeing overall with the dominant Palestinian 
perspective, but also challenging it in some ways. Along these lines, this thesis 
makes reference to “the Palestinian narrative” as a shorthand for the dominant, 
overall Palestinian perspective, as opposed to the Freedom Theatre/Bus 
narrative – although this is still a Palestinian narrative. Such a phenomenon is 
seen more-clearly within Israeli discourse, which sees a political divide between 
Zionists – who support the Israeli annexation of Palestine and its accompanying 
arguments – and anti-/post-Zionists – who challenge these ideas. 
 
(Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2016); Khalidi, The Hundred Years’ War on Palestine; Avi Shlaim, Israel 
and Palestine: Reappraisals, Revisions, Refutations (London: Verso, 2009). 
12 
 
This thesis also borrows the concept of the literary canon – the collation 
of texts considered to be significant or of high value by a particular authority – to 
develop our understanding of how individual narratives are compromised. A 
“historical canon,” rather than being made up of texts and art, is comprised of 
the events, actors and periodisations of a History determined to be significant to 
an individual’s narrative. Whereas a chronology represents all of the elements 
of a History, a canon is an editorialised version of this. “Canon” is fundamentally 
set apart from “narrative” as a separate entity: whilst a canon concerns the raw 
data considered important by a narrator, the accompanying narrative is then 
their subjective interpretation of that data. Such a notion is evident within Israeli-
Palestinian discourse, as the Israeli and Palestinian dominant narratives may 
disagree, but both accept the same chronology of significant events in their 
histories – the 1948 war, 1967 war and Oslo Accords, for example – and thus 
subscribe to and collectively remember the same canon; their narratives then 
disagree on the details within these events. The Freedom Theatre, as a smaller-
scale narrator, then also subscribes to a differing canon, as its localised scope 
means it holds a different perspective of what events and actors are significant. 
Discussion of “canons” in a historical context has so far been predominantly 
limited to the idea of canons of historical writings – the publication of History, as 
a subject, in a literary context.23 In this approach, a “historical canon” is a body 
of literature accompanying a historical narrative. Canons can run much more 
deeply into the field of History than this, however, and historical canons are 
much more pervasive. The edited collection Beyond the Canon begins to 
 
23 Jaakko Tahkokallio, The Anglo-Norman Historical Canon (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2019); Jasper van der Steen, ‘Remembering the Revolt of the Low Countries: Historical 
Canon Formation in the Dutch Republic and Habsburg Netherlands, 1566-1621’, Sixteenth 
Century Journal, XLIX.3 (2018), 713-742. 
13 
 
explore this, although it effectively defines historical “canons” as master 
narratives, presented as definitive history rather than as a historical perspective, 
especially within the context of Western nation-states and pedagogy – “applied 
to history, we might define a canon as follows: it is a historical grand narrative, 
consisting of selected figures, events, story lines, ideas and values, colligated 
by definite plots, perspectives and explanations.” 24 There is an important 
distinction to draw between “narrative” and “canon,” however, as the two, whilst 
inextricably linked, encompass differing elements of a historical perspective; to 
treat “canon” and “master narrative” as synonymous would be semantically 
pointless. Understanding “canon” instead as a narrative-adjacent mechanism 
presents a novel approach that allows us to broaden our understanding of how 
narratives are practically created and justified. 
 
Methodology and Sources 
It is the Freedom Theatre and Bus’ online platforms that this thesis will 
utilise primarily, as the predominant home for its narrative of the Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict.25 Whilst the activists carried out practical action in their 
local communities in order to bear witness, it was through these online media 
that they sought to raise awareness and build alliances, and ultimately construct 
their own narrative.26 Despite its increasing relevancy, as Lisa Blenkinsop 
 
24 Siep Stuurman and Maria Grever, ‘Introduction: Old Canons and New Historians’ in Beyond 
the Canon: History for the Twenty-First Century, ed. by Maria Grever and Siep Stuurman 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 1-16, p.3. 
25 Interviews with current Freedom Theatre/Bus members were decided against partly due to 
the circumstances of the coronavirus pandemic, but also to maintain focus on the narrative 
presented particularly from the Freedom Theatre’s inception up until 2016. These online 
sources were also almost fully in English, being targeted at an international audience, with only 
four Arabic blog posts (although these have been used in this thesis). 
26 Gail Ramsay, Blogs & Literature & Activism: Popular Egyptian Blogs and Literature in Touch 
(Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2017), p.121. 
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acknowledges, the internet has not received the same attention as a historical 
source as it has in other academic areas – instead criticised, as oral history was 
in its inception, for its perceived lack of legitimacy.27 However, as a widely-
accessible platform, the internet is increasingly relied upon by historical actors 
as their primary means of record-keeping and communication. The Freedom 
Theatre and Bus maintained websites, social media pages, YouTube channels, 
and a blog created specifically for the Freedom Bus. The blog will be especially 
relied upon as the most-developed medium used by the Freedom Theatre/Bus 
to present its perspective and narrative – one that has a high degree of freedom 
in the content produced.28 In collating these data for this thesis, the Freedom 
Bus blog (which currently runs from 2012-2016) was analysed in its entirety, 
with significance derived from common and recurring themes, imagery and 
terms evident in the posts, as well as notions otherwise common in Israel-
Palestine that are omitted by the activists. The other social media and internet 
pages were then incorporated where they could provide additional information 
(the Freedom Bus Facebook page, for instance, began posting earlier in 2012, 
prior to the blog) or where they were linked into the Freedom Bus blog (either in 
hyperlinks or in embedded content, which was especially the case for the 
activists’ YouTube channels). In analysing the Freedom Theatre and Bus’ online 
platforms, it became apparent that the Bus blog acted as a centrepiece, around 
which other content was satellited. The posts created for the blog 
simultaneously acted as means of advocacy for the communities the Freedom 
Bus visited, a diary of the annual Rides, advertising for the programme itself, 
and a tool for highlighting and contextualising the oppressive nature of the 
 
27 Lisa Blenkinsop, ‘The Internet: Virtual Space’ in History Beyond the Text, ed. by Sarah Barber 
and Corinna M. Peniston-Bird (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 122-135, p.122. 
28 Michael Jones and Irit Alony, ‘Blogs- the New Source of Data Analysis’, University of 
Wollongong Research Online (2008) <https://ro.uow.edu.au/commpapers/469>, p.11. 
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Israeli occupation. Equally, blogging represents a longer-form medium 
compared to other social media, which do not allow the space for nuanced or 
developed expression in the same way, meaning that it is on the Freedom Bus 
blog that the Theatre/Bus narrative is most apparent.29 Jill Walker Rettberg 
describes blogs as “episodic narratives,” with each post representing a “self-
contained unit that contributes to an overall narrative,” gleaned by the reader 
piecing together fragments from the blog and elsewhere.30 This thesis takes this 
approach, relying primarily on the Freedom Bus blog and supplementing this 
with other sources where useful. 
Alongside these online sources, this thesis also incorporates the productions 
put on by the Freedom Theatre prior to the inception of the Bus initiative, as well 
as a documentary released by Juliano Mer Khamis in 2004 titled Arna’s 
Children. The documentary provides an insight into the work of Arna Mer 
Khamis, as a precursor to the Freedom Theatre, and the perspective held by 
Juliano that would feed into the narrative and operation of the Theatre. 
Somewhat similar to the analyses of the activists’ online platforms, this thesis 
looks at the terms, imagery and concepts that are present or omitted in the 
documentary in order to glean its overall narrative and message.31 The 
Theatre’s productions, as part of the overarching “Cultural Intifada,” then 
demonstrate how this perspective carried through and influenced the activists’ 
actions, before their attention shifted to the Freedom Bus programme. Here, this 
thesis is less concerned with the productions themselves, but rather with how 
 
29 Jill Walker Rettberg, Blogging, 2nd Ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014), p.2. 
30 Rettberg, Blogging, p.119. 
31 Graeme Turner, National Fictions: Literature, Film and the Construction of Australian 
Narrative (Abingdon: Routledge, 2020); Ed S. Tan, Emotion and the Structure of Narrative Film: 
Film as an Emotion Machine (New York: Routledge, 1996); Ib Bondebjerg, ‘Documentary and 




they were advertised and what the reaction was; this is, in part, due to the fact 
that the productions were not available online. However, how the Freedom 
Theatre sold the productions indicates how they synthesised meaning from the 
plays in their Palestinian context, which in turn gives an indication of the 
narrative they were attempting to present. As such, much of the analysis in this 
thesis revolves around close readings and interpretations of these sources as 
vehicles for subjective narrative-sharing. These largely-online sources do not 
provide a complete picture of the physical actions of the Freedom Theatre/Bus 
(although, equally, records of these actions are not readily-available elsewhere). 
However, these sources do demonstrate how the activists sought to present 
themselves and the narrative through which they interpreted their own activism; 
this is especially pertinent as a significant portion of the Freedom Theatre and 
Bus’ activism is devoted to international outreach and, thus, narrative. 
 
Freedom Theatre and Bus Literature 
The majority of current scholarly works on the Freedom Theatre and 
Freedom Bus specifically fall within the scope of theatre studies. These works 
largely explore the nature of the Freedom Theatre and Bus as a form of cultural 
resistance, and a vessel for the creation and perpetuation of a collective 
Palestinian identity and narrative of occupation.32 These articles focus on the 
 
32 Anne Rohrbach, ‘(Re-)Enacting Stories of Trauma: Playback Theatre as a Tool of Cultural 
Resistance in Palestine’, Middle East – Topics & Arguments, 11 (2018), 79-88; Sara Karoline 
Steinmoen, ‘Breaking the Occupation of the Mind: The Freedom Theatre and Palestinian Youth 
Empowerment’ (unpublished master’s thesis, UiT The Arctic University of Norway, 2016); Irene 
Fernández Ramos, ‘Storytelling, Agency and Community-Building through Playback Theatre in 
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Freedom Theatre and Bus’ practical, theatrical activism, especially through its 
use of Playback Theatre techniques. Ben Rivers, for instance, has written 
multiple articles on the Freedom Theatre and Bus, all focussing on its use of 
Playback Theatre as “a unique, community-centred forum for the identification 
and communication of important issues.”33 Significantly, Rivers is also 
mentioned in Freedom Bus blog posts, listed on the Freedom Theatre website 
and included in a Freedom Theatre YouTube video as the “initiator,” “project 
leader” and “bus driver” for the Freedom Bus initiative, and is shown in multiple 
instances to have been present in Palestine for the Freedom Bus Rides.34 
Rivers’ involvement with and proximity to the Freedom Bus programme perhaps 
explains his focus on the practical, theatrical side of the project in particular, 
rather than the Bus’ own narrative as shared online – he himself would actually 
be part of the creation of this narrative. Along these lines, many of the 
academics writing on the Freedom Theatre are, in some way, tied to the 
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organisation, whether they were involved or participated, or knew the activists.35 
Erin Mee, who wrote multiple works on the Freedom Theatre, is known to have 
met Juliano Mer Khamis and is described in a news article as a friend.36 
Another academic, Mark LeVine, endorsed the Freedom Bus, partook in its 
events and published news articles on behalf of the Bus.37 The theatre studies 
approach, and varying degrees of proximity and involvement of many of those 
writing on the Freedom Theatre and Bus, means that the perspective given is 
often focussed on the performances and local activism carried out by the group, 
thus omitting the broader actions of the activists. Similar to these works is an 
edited collection titled The Freedom Theatre: Performing Cultural Resistance in 
Palestine, produced in conjunction with the Freedom Theatre, reflecting on its 
origins, projects, leading figures, activism, cultural resistance and future.38 The 
attention of these works is less on a critical approach to the Freedom Theatre 
itself, however, and more so on the application of its methods in the Conflict. A 
historical, interdisciplinary approach – rather than theatre studies – allows us to 
better-understand how the Freedom Theatre/Bus functions over time as an 
 
35 Alexandria Milton and Irene Fernández Ramos, ‘From the Speech to the Act: Performativity 
on the Margins’, SOAS Journal of Postgraduate Research, 7 (2014), 
<https://www.soas.ac.uk/sjpr/edition-7/file96759.pdf>, p.1. 
36 Erin B. Mee, ‘Juliano Mer Khamis: Murder, Theatre, Freedom, Going Forward’, TDR: The 
Drama Review, 55.3 (2011), 9-17; Erin B. Mee, ‘Mindscapes of Palestine’ in The Theatre of 
Naomi Wallace: Embodied Dialogues, ed. by Scott T. Cummings and Erica Stevens Abbitt (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 223-225; Olivia Stransky, ‘The Stage is my Gun: The Cultural 
Intifada of Juliano Mer-Khamis’, Sampsonia Way, 7th January 2012, 
<https://www.sampsoniaway.org/bi-monthly/2012/01/07/the-stage-is-my-gun-the-cultural-
intifada-of-juliano-mer-khamis/> [Accessed 30th October 2020]. 
37 Mark LeVine, ‘Angry Jews on the Freedom Bus’, Tikkun, 29.4 (2014), 9-10; The Freedom 
Bus, ‘An extraordinary statement by Mark LeVine in support of the Freedom Bus’, 
@thefreedombus, 21st March 2012, (Facebook post), 
<https://www.facebook.com/thefreedombus/posts/332907363424643> [Accessed 1st September 
2021]; The Freedom Bus, ‘Day #6’, Freedom Bus: Ride for Justice (2014) 
<https://freedombuspalestine.wordpress.com/2014/03/23/day-6/> [Accessed 1st September 
2021]; Mark LeVine, ‘It will be wonderful… when women can walk freely’, Al-Jazeera, 25th April 
2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2012/4/25/it-will-be-wonderful-when-women-can-
walk-freely/>. 
38 Ola Johansson and Johanna Wallin (eds.), The Freedom Theatre: Performing Cultural 
Resistance in Palestine (New Delhi: Leftword, 2018). 
19 
 
activist group, rather than simply as an isolated example of theatrical 
resistance. 
Another way the Freedom Theatre has been approached in academics is with 
obituary-style or legacy articles about Juliano Mer Khamis in the wake of his 
death.39 These largely focussed on the cultural and theatrical work Mer Khamis 
had carried out with the Freedom Theatre, and the impact it had on and the 
response it elicited from the Jenin camp. These obituarial works are the closest 
Freedom Theatre scholarship comes to exploring the challenges to Palestinian 
narration; however, they are not framed in this way, but rather approach it as an 
attempt to pursue a different form of resistance and way of life in a comparably 
conservative society. The overall scope of the existing academic writings on the 
Freedom Theatre and Bus is on its physical, theatrical activities and its 
emphasis on cultural resistance, especially as a more-palatable alternative to 
violent resistance. These works make reference to “narrative” in a collective 
sense, more so as an offshoot of Palestinian identity, or look at the Freedom 
Theatre’s productions that supposedly challenged Palestinian or Jenin’s social 
norms, as a sort-of narrative. These writings, however, over-simplify the 
meaning of “narrative,” and do not adequately explore in enough depth how the 
Freedom Theatre and Bus created and presented a broader sense of narrative, 
and went about disseminating this. They also do not contextualise what 
narrating, as a Palestinian (activist), means and what its purpose is, especially 
in a broader context. This thesis, instead, will approach the Freedom Theatre 
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not primarily for its theatrical technique, but rather as an example of an activist 
group set somewhat apart from the typical approach and history of Palestinian 
activism and resistance, and use this unique position to explore how non-
dominant Palestinian narrators fit into the broader Israeli-Palestinian discourse. 
 
Argument 
 Following this theoretical and methodological approach, this thesis is 
concerned overall with understanding the position of the Palestinian narrative, 
both in its overarching, dominant position and in its more-individualised 
iterations. This thesis will focus primarily on the latter perspective, that of the 
non-dominant Palestinian narrator, to glean the discursive and physical 
challenges posed to the narrators themselves, rather than simply focus on the 
Palestinian narrative as an abstract entity. The first chapter, however, will 
contextualise this by exploring the current state of Israeli-Palestinian discourse 
and historiography, especially since the time of the Oslo Accords, to understand 
the impetuses behind the Palestinian perspective and analyse how these equip 
Palestinian narrators to challenge Israel. Particular emphasis will be placed on 
the overall narratives and paradigms present, and how these interact. The 
thesis will then shift its attention towards the difficulties for individual, non-
dominant Palestinian narrators in navigating this discourse and its hegemonies. 
The second chapter will do this by tracing the history of the Freedom Theatre 
and then Freedom Bus, especially though the development of their personal 
narrative, and how this navigated the Israeli-Palestinian discourse and 
interacted with its dominant narratives. Beyond simply looking at theoretical 
discourse, this thesis also explores the physicality of Palestinian narratives, 
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bringing in the real-world context surrounding narrators, both as a means of 
influencing and limiting the narrative they produce. The third chapter does this 
by interpreting the physical symbols the Freedom Bus includes in the narrative it 
presents through its blogs, especially along aesthetical lines, and 
contextualising the scope of the Bus’ activism in the issues it faces through its 
own operation within the Israeli occupation. The final chapter will then 
contextualise narration within the realm of Palestinian activism, understanding 
the significance of narrative to this activism, the role it plays and who it 
ultimately serves, especially as part of twenty-first century trends. Ultimately, 
this thesis – rather than simply recounting the Palestinian narrative as a 
challenge to Israeli dominance or talking about the Palestinian narrative as an 
absolute, finalised entity – explores the deep intricacies and nuances of the 
efforts to tell such narratives, and how these efforts and the resulting narratives 
can vary. Such an approach will help us better-understand the foundations upon 




The Current State of Palestinian Narration: Challenging the “Conflict” and 
Interpreting the Palestinian-Orientated Frameworks 
 Israeli-Palestinian discourse – the narratives argued and the conflicting 
historiographies – often falls into disagreements on aggression and defence, 
who initiated conflict, what truly did or did not happen, or who is following the 
imposed rules. Israeli and Palestinian narratives, as with narratives more 
typically, put forward their respective perspective of events. One well-known 
example of this is the debate on 1948 – the War of Independence versus al-
Nakba, the catastrophe – focussing on issues such as Israeli aggression, 
whether Palestinians were present and whether Palestinians left their land of 
their own accord.40 However, with these Israeli and Palestinian narratives, there 
is a broader, more-abstracted nuance fairly overlooked as to how these 
narratives frame themselves, even before any discussion of tangible events. 
This element is seen in more recent historiographic and activist efforts, with the 
application of new paradigms to understand the relationship between Israel and 
Palestine. These changes especially emerged in parallel to the Oslo Accords 
and Second Intifada, as ordinary Palestinians became disillusioned with the 
status quo on both the Israeli and Palestinian sides.41 Whereas the First Intifada 
had seen calls to end Israeli occupation – military control of land inevitably 
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acquired through conflict – the Second now saw calls for the end of Israeli 
colonialism – an intentional process of settlement and displacement. What 
results is a debate between the hegemonic Conflict paradigm and the Israeli 
status quo, and the newer Palestinian-led Settler-Colonial and Apartheid 
paradigms.42 The paradigm employed by a narrative inherently leads its 
perspective of events, and the debates it has and the questions it asks. It also 
informs how actors in the context are perceived and labelled. These influences 
can also be problematic, however, for these same reasons, as they can skew 
(self-)perception of Palestinians. The Palestinian peoples exist in multiple legal 
and geographic states, meaning that the transposition of an established 
paradigm can simplify the meaning of “Palestinian” or omit certain groups for 
simplicity’s sake, or indeed ignore the bespoke and varied intricacies of Israeli 
policies by defining it as merely a colonial or an apartheid state.43 What 
becomes apparent are the intricacies and difficulties in how Palestinians do or 
should narrate their own history, and how they should engage with or disengage 
from the existing narrative discourse. 
The Conflict paradigm is the most-widely accepted and utilised 
framework for understanding Israel-Palestine. The frame has been adopted by 
Israel and is thus an integral part of the dominant narrative. The main 
implication of the Conflict label for the Palestinians is the resultant framing of 
the Israelis and Palestinians as two sovereign sides in a long-running war; the 
Palestinians are enemy soldiers – valid targets – rather than dominated 
civilians. Israel-Palestine’s dominant canon is also framed around the Conflict 
paradigm, with the canonical events predominantly consisting of wars and the 
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history’s periodisation similarly indicated by military developments. Whilst there 
is an undeniable logic in framing periodical shifts around military encounters, as 
these form the impetus for shifts in policy and relations, presentation of the 
canon entirely within the lexicon of war whitewashes the nuance of the reality 
on-the-ground and only serves to bolster the dominant Israeli narrative. Where 
Israel and the Arab states were clearly in a state of war, the same cannot be 
said for the Palestinians and, as such, the canonical shift in periodisation from 
the “Arab-Israeli Conflict” to the “Israeli-Palestinian Conflict” perpetuates the 
Conflict frame for the sake of its own hegemony, rather than because the 
dynamic between Israelis and Palestinians reflects a state of war in its 
traditional understanding. The Conflict paradigm and the notion of the “peace 
process” serves those dominating the discourse well and does not demand any 
significant change of the status quo, and so there is no incentive to deviate from 
this.44 Ilan Pappé refers to this using a borrowed term, “The Dictionary of the 
Peace Orthodoxy” – a lexicon of acceptable phrases derived from a belief in a 
two-state solution, wherein the two sides are engaged in a consensual conflict 
and equally hold responsibility for ending violence.45 This Dictionary remains 
dominant amongst diplomats, politicians, academics and activists, particularly in 
the West.46 As a result, the same framework for peace has remained in place 
since the Oslo Accords of the 1990s, allowing Israel a “victor’s peace” wherein it 
can continue annexing Palestine, upheld by international actors as part of the 
dominant solution.47 For the Palestinians, in the words of Mandy Turner, the 
outcome has been the development of a “zombie peace” wherein “the 
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[Palestinian Authority] can continue to stagger on like a zombie” as long as third 
parties continue to prop it up, and the Israeli and Western-dominated “peace 
process” requires it to survive.48 The enactment of the Oslo Accords also 
allowed the pro-Israeli actors to frame the argument for a lack of ensuing peace, 
with the blame placed predominantly on Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism, 
or any form of violent Palestinian resistance – it is the fault of “extremists” 
undermining the agreement, not inherent flaws in the process.49 The “peace 
process” becomes a pro-Israeli fabrication which has, in the words of Pappé: 
Been accepted, with modifications, by a powerful coalition of the United 
States, European Union, Russia, the United Nations, most of the Arab 
states, the Fatah Palestinian leadership, the Zionist Left and Centre 
Israel, and some well-known figures in the Palestinian solidarity 
movement. It is the power of the coalition and not the logic of the solution 
or the process that has maintained the “peace process” for so long, 
despite its apparent failure.50 
Ultimately, the Conflict paradigm represents a narrative endorsed by those with 
a vested interest, who seek to avoid full responsibility being placed on Israel, or 
for whom it is convenient to maintain the current state of affairs. This artificial 
dominance then brings others to perpetuate this perspective. 
Some who adhere to the Conflict paradigm have opted to use the term 
“Palestinian-Israeli” rather than “Israeli-Palestinian” Conflict – often seemingly 
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without explanation. However, this appears to be little more than a superficial 
symbolic gesture of good will, which in actuality perpetuates the 
characterisation of Palestinians as equal participants in a just war and perhaps 
even places emphasis on Palestinian involvement in particular. The 
Palestinians have begun to challenge the Conflict paradigm in one canonical 
event/period particularly – the 1948 War and its aftermath – by labelling it al-
Nakba in order to emphasise the Palestinian suffering, but this effort stops here 
and the dominant canon is left unchanged otherwise. There has been some 
reference amongst Palestinians to the events of 1967 as al-Naksa (declaring 
the 5th June “Naksa Day”) to frame the 1967 War in the Palestinian perspective 
– not one in a series of consensual conflicts, but a major setback in the search 
for statehood – but this has not reached the mainstream (inherently Israeli-
orientated) discourse or indeed the dominant canon.51 Some proponents of the 
Israeli narrative have, on the other hand, referred to the Second Intifada as the 
“Oslo War,” for example, to argue that the Palestinians had always planned to 
use Oslo to enact violence and destroy Israel, and to maintain the presence of 
the Conflict paradigm in the dominant canon.52 In some ways, if Israel-Palestine 
is to be understood in a conflictual paradigm, then it might be more apt to say 
that the war – both militarily and diplomatically – was won sometime early on 
(perhaps when the US decided it would support the Zionists, thus almost 
singlehandedly assuring Israel’s continued success) and what we are seeing 
now is a drawn-out, unilateral armistice negotiation.53 Generally speaking, there 
is a strong counter-consensus challenging the use of the phrase “peace 
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process” – an offshoot of the Conflict paradigm – but it is perhaps necessary to 
go one step further and question the use of the Conflict label entirely. Other 
frameworks such as Settler-Colonialism and Apartheid inherently throw off the 
notion of the Israeli-Palestinian dynamic being a “Conflict” in their assessments 
to some extent, but the rejection has not appeared to be explicit or necessarily 
intentional. 
Israel-Palestine saw a “settler-colonial turn,” sparked by Patrick Wolfe’s 
1999 work Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology and 
propelled by growing Palestinian disillusionment with the Oslo process, 
although Israeli and Palestinian writers had engaged with the paradigm 
previously.54 The basic premise of the “colonial analogy” is to confront the 
Israeli security narrative by highlighting Israeli fixation on land possession, 
within which, as Nadia Naser-Najjab and Ghassan Khatib phrase it, “the political 
and economic subordination of the indigenous population, the monopolisation of 
natural resources, and the control of internal markets therefore appear as 
means that are directed towards this end.”55 The Settler-Colonial paradigm also 
inherently upsets the dominant Israeli-Palestinian canon, understanding settler-
colonialism and invasion as an ongoing structure, rather than an event – it is a 
process of displacement, punctuated by instances of greater efficiency or 
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intensity, such as 1948/al-Nakba and 1967/al-Naksa, which are typically 
otherwise interpreted as isolated events.56 
In so far as Palestinian identity is concerned, however, the Settler-Colonial 
paradigm inserts Palestinians into the role of the “native.” This becomes 
problematic as the only qualification necessary to be considered the “native” in 
a settler-colonial context is to be the party originally holding the land; there is 
nothing uniquely Palestinian necessary – “Palestinian” and “Other” become 
synonymous. Indigeneity becomes a declaration of existence and continued 
presence – as if to say we were here before and we are still here now, despite 
the coloniser’s efforts. Along these lines, a common Palestinian mantra is “to 
exist is to resist.”57 Being subject to colonisation replaces the native’s identity, 
and the risk of the Settler-Colonial paradigm is to normalise this and present 
Palestinian identity in much the same way. The native’s culture becomes a 
decorative backdrop to accentuate the loss and add to the tragedy, as they not 
only lose their land, but their culture by extension. A colonial paradigm also 
holds a particular implication for interpreting Palestinian nationalistic or identity-
related development. Fanon, in his own context, argued that it was not the 
same to be “Algerian” before and after colonialism – decolonisation sees the 
complete and immediate substitution of one “species” for another.58 Despite 
being in the midst of the colonial process, “Palestinian” has gone through a 
similar development. It was not the same to be a Palestinian moving from 
Ottoman to British to Israeli rule, and again not the same after Palestinians were 
offered a very limited degree of autonomy during Oslo, or even constant during 
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any of these periods. In this regard, “Palestinian” is little more than a 
simulacrum representing an identity that shifts according to the ever-changing 
degree of colonisation the Palestinian peoples were and are subjected to; the 
contents of the identity are never the same, but they fall under the same label.59 
Put succinctly, the most striking issue with the Settler-Colonial paradigm, from 
the standpoint of the Palestinian narrative, is that it is ultimately an analysis of 
Israel – it focusses on the coloniser and its methods, and the native character is 
a reactive extra that is ultimately only necessarily present as a statistic.60 
One further criticism, however, is that typically a Settler-Colonial paradigm 
applies to a state that has completed its colonisation process, and absorbed or 
cleansed the native population.61 In this regard, the paradigm is somewhat 
predisposed to understand Palestinians as an already-assimilated group – a 
people who have lost their chance at sovereignty and have disappeared or 
become second-class citizens, and a past that Israel has to come to terms with. 
The risk then becomes perceiving Palestinians in this light, as a defeated 
people who now belong to Israel. Pappé argues that, at this point, there is no 
better alternative to the Settler-Colonial paradigm for analysing Israel-Palestine, 
which perhaps highlights a significant justification for its use seen in other 
aspects of the Palestinian narrative: the necessity to, first and foremost, counter 
the dominant Israeli narrative.62 What becomes apparent is that the Settler-
Colonial paradigm was not brought in to represent Palestinians, but to counter 
Israel. That the paradigm’s application is presently imperfect is less important 
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when the current importance lies in entering its phraseology into the 
lexicographic discourse; associating Israel with ethnic cleansing is the ultimate 
goal from an activist’s standpoint – the historiographic finetuning can come 
later. 
 The Apartheid paradigm sees similar issues to Settler-Colonialism. The 
Apartheid and Settler-Colonial paradigms are often employed together to 
equate Israel-Palestine with South Africa and to warn of a similar fate for the 
Palestinians to that of the Native Americans.63 Other academic fields, such as 
indigenous studies, become useful comparatives for articulating and legitimising 
the challenges facing Palestinians.64 For supporters of Palestine, the use of 
such comparisons is to upset the aforementioned “Dictionary of Peace 
Orthodoxy”: the Israeli occupation can be deemed temporary and is 
recognisable in international law, but Israeli apartheid is a crime against 
humanity with no morally-justifiable defence; Israeli occupation can be ended by 
a simple withdrawal, but Israeli apartheid can only be ended through the 
creation of Israeli-Palestinian equality.65 With such a change in rhetoric, it would 
no longer be a case of a simple military withdrawal, but of systematic change 
within Israel itself. The paradigm also appears to be employed as a means a 
describing a facet of Israeli occupation (or indeed the overall system), the intent 
behind it and how the reader should feel about it in a concise, easily-understood 
way – Israel’s control of water resources in the Occupied Territories is easily 
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understood and interpreted through the phrase “water apartheid,” for instance.66 
For Palestinian identity, however, the Apartheid paradigm becomes problematic 
as it inherently treats Palestinians as citizens of Israel. A news article covering a 
mass demonstration against Israeli annexation plans in June 2020 highlights 
some of the aspects of this issue.67 The article states that the Israeli political 
Left has placed support for Palestinians as a precondition for defining itself as 
“Left” at all – a positive change for Palestinian representation, but one that 
implies that Palestinians are inextricably linked to and a part of the Left of Israeli 
politics, rather than their own political body.68 This adoption is also problematic 
as the article goes on to recognise that the Israeli Left and Palestinian citizens 
of Israel are “still far from speaking the same language and formulating a single 
political goal,” also highlighting that some Israeli protestors brought Israeli flags, 
rather than Palestinian.69 
The use of the Apartheid paradigm to understand Palestinian identity is also 
problematic as the regime’s relationship with the oppressed is different between 
South Africa and Israel-Palestine. Whilst, in South Africa, the Apartheid regime 
relied on the Black population for their labour, the intent behind the Israeli 
regime is to cleanse Palestinian land of Palestinians.70 The Apartheid paradigm 
brings Palestinians into the Israeli fold as citizens of an inequal regime, whilst 
also to some extent ignoring that that same regime does not only see them as 
inferior, but an obstacle to be removed. Ultimately, a paradigm that treats all 
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Palestinians as citizens of Israel is inherently problematic, especially as the 
Palestinians themselves cannot be thought of as one people, but instead as 
multiple distinct groups: those living in the West Bank, those in Gaza, those 
within the Green Line (citizens of Israel), refugees and the diaspora. Israel itself 
benefits from the divided and ill-defined position of the Palestinian peoples; if 
they fell into a specific category, they would be unequivocally granted particular 
rights – existing between or within multiple categories means any potentially-
applicable rights can be argued against. For Israel, the situation must appear 
messy and intractable. Since occupying the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, the 
Israelis have consistently argued that the Fourth Geneva Convention is not 
applicable, thereby choosing when international law regarding occupation is 
relevant.71 Israeli discourse has also treated with ambiguity the status of 
Palestine – is the occupation temporary or protracted, or does it even exist at 
all?72 Reliance on a paradigm that instead puts the Palestinians into one group 
with the role of the “oppressed” threatens to ignore such an issue, but, like the 
Settler-Colonial paradigm, leave the Palestinians as an Other. 
 Whilst preferable to the pro-Israeli Conflict paradigm, the more recent 
trend amongst post- or anti-Zionist actors to use the Apartheid or Settler-
Colonial paradigms has its own problems in regards to applicability. The 
clearest issue is the imperfect transposition of these paradigms to the 
Palestinian situation, as they come with pre-attached implications and, to some 
extent, their own historical baggage. A larger issue, especially in relation to the 
Palestinian narrative, is that Apartheid and Settler-Colonialism are means of 
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interpreting Israel and its behaviour, rather than the Palestinians, who in either 
case are still little more than the “non-Jew” placeholders Said refers to – 
background actors for Israeli history. That being said, and particularly from an 
activist standpoint, the mere presence of the apartheid or colonial labels is 
justification-enough for their use. Whilst the dominant narrative has the 
Palestinians as enemy combatants who refuse peace – an easy justification for 
the support of Israel – it is much harder to support a regime that is known to be 
intentionally ethnically-cleansing a people. This, taken with the understanding 
that current Palestinian historiography is inherently more concerned with 
countering the dominant Israeli narrative, explains their presence in the 
Palestinian narrative. 
The above analysis leads to one final point of contention facing the 
construction of the Palestinian narrative. It is not simply a case of asking what 
the history of Palestine is and how it should be interpreted, but also who is 
writing it. Typically, in the discussion of the History (as a definitive chronology) 
of Israel-Palestine and the historiography of this, it is written that there was first 
a Zionistic historical account, which wholly favoured Israel, until the emergence 
of the New Historians in the 1980s, who challenged some of the core 
arguments of the Zionists’ history, questioned some of Israel’s actions and 
ushered in the notion of post-Zionism.73 Whilst this was undoubtedly a 
significant development in the discourse surrounding Israeli-Palestinian history 
and certainly something of a victory for Palestinians, it is important to note that 
these two supposedly monolithic polar opposites are still both situated within the 
Israeli perspective; the New Historians were and are not Palestinian historians, 
 




and were and are writing Israeli histories. There is a query to be raised about 
whether these post-Zionist historians truly countered the Zionist narrative to the 
extent that they championed a Palestinian narrative, or if the Palestinians were 
still thought of as merely “non-Jews,” but perhaps ones that were owed better 
treatment. Fundamentally, it is worth asking of the New Historians: does it 
matter that the Palestinians were the subject of their revisions, or are the 
Palestinians only present in the post-Zionist narrative by geographic 
happenstance? If Zionism had selected another location to create its state, the 
post-Zionists would not write about Palestinians. Post-Zionism is ultimately not 
a Palestinian telling, but an Israeli retelling. As Pappé, one of the New 
Historians, writes, Israel, as the “stronger party,” “had formed a state and 
employed the state’s apparatus for successfully propagating its narrative in front 
of domestic as well as external audiences. The weaker party [Palestine], in this 
case, was engaged in a national liberation struggle, unable to lend its historians 
a hand in opposing the propaganda of the other side.”74 In this sense, a 
pronounced History of Palestine was potentially drowned out, overshadowed by 
the debate between a Palestinian-omitted Israeli history and a Palestinian-
recognitive Israeli history. 
By extension, the Palestinians had no say in the overarching canon of the 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Pappé goes on to acknowledge that this trend has 
changed, with Palestinian historians now presenting a Palestinian history: “the 
Palestinian historians challenged a major Zionist claim about the absence of 
any meaningful Palestinian existence before the arrival of the new Jewish 
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community in the pre-Zionist era.”75 However, even much of the existing 
historiography written by Palestinians frames itself in relation to the dominant 
narrative and to other actors in Israel-Palestine – understandably, perhaps, 
considering the need to counter the dominant (Israeli) narrative and highlight 
such actors’ actions – rather than presenting a definitive Palestinian narrative 
and canon of their history. For instance, Rashid Khalidi’s recent publication, The 
Hundred Years’ War on Palestine, “rather than [writing] a comprehensive survey 
of Palestinian history, [chose] to focus on six turning points in the struggle over 
Palestine. These six events . . . highlight the colonial nature of the hundred 
years’ war on Palestine, and also the indispensable role of external powers in 
waging it.”76 One of the underlying purposes of the book thus becomes to raise 
awareness of the true nature of the actions of Israel and its supporters – to act 
as an advocate for the Palestinian perspective, and against the Israeli 
occupation and its status quo. At the same time, however, Khalidi’s book is 
framed around Israeli attacks on Palestinians and, in doing so, conforms to the 
Israeli canon. In necessarily combatting the Israeli narrative of events and 
highlighting the true nature of their actions – not of inevitable military conflict, 
but of violent outcomes of the Zionist programme – Palestinian narrators are 
making their case, but continue to do so within the scope set in place by the 
Israelis themselves. 
It is perhaps too close to the past and currently-ongoing history of Israel-
Palestine, or too early in a process, for an unadulterated dominant Palestinian 
narrative to emerge, not required to explicitly challenge the narrative of 
Palestine’s oppressors. Indeed, in ‘Permission to Narrate,’ Said argues that 
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Palestinians will initially have to assume the role of changing the dominant 
consensus, which is perhaps what is being reflected in current scholarship.77 
Such a dynamic may also never end, so long as the Israeli occupation and 
colonisation continues. The role of the Palestinian historian or narrator can then 
be understood to also be one of an activist; they are not only presenting a 
history, but arguing for its existence and reacting to the changing reality on the 
ground. Such efforts also have to be carried out against the hegemony of the 
dominant Conflict paradigm, that allows Israel to maintain the status quo and 
continue its annexation of Palestinian land, whilst also allowing its allies to 
comfortably support it. In this vein, Palestinian narrators have also struggled to 
negotiate their own dialogic space, instead being corralled into limitations 
deemed acceptable by the dominant powers. The introduction of the Settler-
Colonial and Apartheid paradigms challenges these limitations, shifting the 
frame away from an equal-parts-blame conflict to a deliberate process of 
cleansing carried out by Israel. At the same time, however, these paradigms 
see their own limitations, especially in regards to their characterisations of 
Palestinians. Such limitations set out by the lack of a dominant dialogic space 
are also seen in who is or has previously been predominantly writing the history 
of Israel-Palestine; the debate is still largely dominated by Israeli voices, 
between the Zionists and the political Left. Overall, the state of the discourse 
surrounding Israel-Palestine leaves no one correct answer as to how 
Palestinians should go about their narration, but rather a unifying goal to resist 
erasure and a growing lexicography to utilise in the fight for this aim. The nature 
and minutiae of this narration, however, are still ultimately left to the individual 
narrators. 
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Narrating Freedom from the Theatre to the Bus: Navigating Discourse in 
the Palestinian Context 
 With a firmly-rooted broader narrative discourse and pressure on 
Palestinians to argue their existence, there are inherent challenges and shifts 
demanded of Palestinian narrators and activists. For individual narrators – 
rather than nationalised or dominant narrators – they not only compete with the 
opposing dominant Israeli narrative, but the consensus of the dominant 
Palestinian narrative as well, as it dictates what these narrators should narrate 
and how they should go about this. The Freedom Theatre, with its roots in the 
1980s through to its creation in 2006 and its continuation into the present, has 
expectedly seen shifts in the narrative it presents of Israel-Palestine. What has 
been a constant, however, has been the fundamental focusses of this narrative. 
The Freedom Theatre can best be described as having two core strands in its 
narrative – two arguments that are at times distinct and at others overlap. The 
first and perhaps most-expected strand is the challenge to the Israeli 
occupation. The second strand, however, demonstrates the point of contention 
that distinguishes it from the dominant Palestinian narrative – a challenge to 
Palestinian cultural and societal norms, most commonly manifested in 
challenges to violence and constrictive, conservative social norms. This 
challenge to Palestinian society began with the “Care and Learning” (or 
“Learning and Freedom”) project (the forerunner to the Freedom Theatre, 
created by Arna Mer Khamis) as it “use[d] theatre and art to address the chronic 
fear, depression and trauma experienced by children in Jenin Refugee Camp.”78 
Whilst concerned with the Israeli occupation, the project was inherently 
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introspective, also seeking to challenge the children’s mindsets. Arna’s 
Children, a documentary made by Arna’s son, Juliano Mer Khamis (a more-
immediate precursor to the Freedom Theatre) continued this introspective 
approach to Palestine, following the children formally involved in the Care and 
Learning project as many of them lost their lives in the Second Intifada. The 
Freedom Theatre then undertook what they refer to as the “‘Cultural Intifada’ – a 
movement that harnesses the force of creativity and artistic expression in the 
quest for freedom, justice and equality.”79 The “Cultural Intifada” period of the 
Freedom Theatre’s history saw its most explicit clashes with the dominant 
Palestinian narrative, as it faced direct conflict with those that disagreed with its 
alternative approach, climaxing with the murder of Juliano Mer Khamis outside 
the Theatre in 2011. The Freedom Bus then presents a decisive shift in the 
balance between the Theatre’s two narrative strands, as its purpose is 
decidedly focussed on challenging the Israeli occupation. What is seen, 
ultimately, is an attempt to set out an alternative narrative for the Palestinian 
experience that, through conflict, connection and education, comes to 
assimilate with the dominant Palestinian narrative and its paradigms. 
 
The Mer Khamis 
 Arna Mer was a Jewish Israeli born during the Mandate period in 1929, in 
the Upper Galilee, now a part of Israel.80 Joining the Palmach – part of the 
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Jewish Haganah paramilitary formed during the British Mandate – Arna became 
disillusioned with Zionism after her involvement in driving the Bedouin out of the 
Negev; she became a member of the Israeli Communist Party in the 1950s and 
began to campaign for Palestinian rights.81 Arna would go on to marry Saliba 
Khamis, a prominent, Palestinian member of the Communist Party and have 
three sons, adopting the surname Mer Khamis.82 In 1987, at the time of the First 
Intifada, Arna, a teacher by training, founded the organisation “In the Defence of 
Children under Occupation” (or “Care and Learning”), which aimed to support 
Palestinian children who were suffering as a result of the occupation and the 
surrounding violence, working – amongst other things – to support their 
education.83 As part of these efforts, Arna created four “Children’s Houses” in 
Jenin to provide the opportunity for learning and creative expression; by 1993, 
there were over 1500 children enrolled.84 Arna was welcomed as a guest in 
Jenin, stating in an acceptance speech given in Sweden for the Right Livelihood 
Award that she had “received the greatest prize of all – their smiles, their 
confidence, their friendship – all of which have served to breed a new human 
relationship between Jews and Arabs.”85 Arna used the award’s accompanying 
funds to build the Stone Theatre, a children’s theatre, on the top floor of the 
Zubeidi family home in Jenin.86 This is where Arna’s Children picks up. The 
documentary begins by following the Stone Theatre’s work, until Arna’s death 
from cancer in 1995.87 
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 Juliano Mer Khamis was Arna’s second son, born in 1958 and growing 
up in Nazareth and Haifa; with a Palestinian-Christian father and a Jewish-
Israeli mother, he described himself in later years as “100 per cent Palestinian 
and 100 per cent Jewish.”88 In his early life, however, he mainly identified with 
his Jewish-Israeli side; he stopped speaking Arabic for a time and joined the 
IDF at age eighteen, despite his parents’ political stances and disapproval, 
being stationed in Jenin.89 According to Adam Shatz: 
By the time Juliano was stationed there, it had evolved into a concrete 
slum where more than ten thousand people were squeezed into a space 
not much bigger than five hundred square metres. If a soldier killed an 
old woman or a child by accident a weapon would be planted on the 
corpse: Juliano’s job was to carry the bag with the weapons.90 
Juliano’s time in the military ended after an altercation with his commanding 
officer; he refused an order to search an elderly Palestinian man, then punching 
the officer.91 Juliano spent several months in prison before leaving the army in 
1978.92 He turned to acting, enrolling in the Beit-Zvi School for the Performing 
Arts in Tel Aviv and launching a successful career in TV, cinema and stage 
productions.93 According to Shatz, “his life as an Israeli Jew was over” after 
Juliano left the IDF; at the performing arts school, he could be an Arab, Jew or 
neither.94 Shatz also states that, living in the Philippines for a year in 1987, 
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Juliano “lost all [his] identities,” embracing his Israeli-Palestinian duality.95 
Juliano then joined Arna in her efforts in Jenin, leading theatre groups, directing 
plays and filming the work of the Care and Learning project.96 As Shatz writes: 
At first his students looked at him warily . . . but he formed lasting 
friendships – among them with Samira Zubeidi’s son Zakaria, who would 
later become a leader of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, a militia of young 
men affiliated with Fatah, and a co-founder of the Freedom Theatre.97 
Juliano would leave Jenin after Arna’s death, only returning in 2002, after the 
Second Intifada’s Battle of Jenin, to find out what had become of the children he 
worked with as part of Care and Learning.98 
 
Arna’s Children 
 In 2004, Juliano Mer Khamis released Arna’s Children, a documentary 
about the “Learning and Freedom” theatre project, primarily following the 
children who partook in this project, focussing on their childhoods in Arna’s 
theatre and their later involvement in the Second Intifada. The documentary is 
revealing in its demonstration of Juliano’s perception and narrative of the issues 
facing Palestinians, and as a precursor to the Freedom Theatre and Bus’ 
narrative and canon. The documentary’s attention is fixated more so on a 
debate of the nature of Palestinian resistance – peaceful protest versus 
violence – than on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, with Israel playing an ancillary 
role. That being said, the documentary still underlyingly incorporates Palestinian 
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paradigms regarding Israel, and these can be gauged from the documentary. 
Ultimately, what emerges is an individual’s narrative of the Israeli-Palestinian 
Conflict, heavily influenced and led by Juliano’s personal experiences, and less 
concerned with existing discourse. 
 Arna’s Children presents an early version of what would become the 
Freedom Theatre/Bus’ narrative and canon of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. 
The documentary creates its own canon of the events, actors and periods that 
proceeded the Freedom Theatre, as well as incorporating parts of the dominant 
narrative of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict relevant to the Mer Khamis’ own 
history. The documentary most often refers to the First Intifada, and the “Battle 
of Jenin” – part of the Second Intifada – as a looming spectre and then tragedy. 
The major events seen as fundamental to the dominant narratives and canons 
of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict are largely omitted from the narrative 
presented by the documentary. 1948, for instance, is only mentioned in relation 
to Arna’s personal history, as she joined the Palmach and fought for the 
creation of Israel.99 Similarly, whilst the Oslo Accords may hold some implicit 
significance, as they facilitated the increased reliance on violence seen in the 
Second Intifada, they are never mentioned in the documentary.100 Arna’s 
Children instead follows a specific course of events that span the personal 
experiences of the Mer Khamis and the theatre children from the First to 
Second Intifada, with other events only mentioned or implicitly included. The 
documentary’s narrative is built around these personal experiences, with, for 
instance, the major turning point for the documentary coming after Arna dies 
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and the Stone Theatre is destroyed during the Second Intifada.101 From this 
point, the documentary focusses on finding out what happened to the children 
after the theatre closed. As far as the documentary’s canon is concerned, this is 
a distinct and significant change in periodisation from pre- to post-theatre 
closure.102 In this regard, Arna’s Children is inherently insular and highly 
localised, focussing on the local events that impact ordinary Palestinians – 
particularly in Jenin. The narrative and canon the documentary creates are less 
concerned with overarching political phenomena, and more so with the 
individualised, human experience. 
The ultimate argument of Arna’s Children is its implied condemnation of 
violence as a means of resistance. Both the contents of the documentary – the 
interviews, conversations and quotes that have been included – and its framing 
and editing are geared towards an emphasis on the negativity of violence and 
particularly the loss of childhood innocence. The documentary makes frequent 
use of jarring juxtapositions between images of violence and youthful 
innocence. An early example of this comes around ten minutes into the 
documentary, when the audience is shown a group of children acting as 
animals whilst Juliano Mer Khamis narrates “this is Nidal. He is the youngest 
one in the group. In six years’ time, during the al-Aqsa Intifada, Nidal will join 
the Islamic Jihad Movement and will be killed during the fighting against the 
Israeli army” and “we used to call Ashraf ‘shorty with the big smile.’ During the 
al-Aqsa Intifada, Ashraf will lead a group of fighters in the battle of Jenin.”103 
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The documentary is very intentionally edited throughout to elicit empathy for the 
children of Jenin and then confront this empathy with the violent reality in 
Palestine to lead the audience to the conclusion that the children’s turn to 
violent resistance is a tragedy. In a fairly late scene of the documentary, Juliano 
confronts one of the former theatre children, Mahmoud, about a suicide attack 
carried out by another of the children, Yousef.104 At the end of the scene, 
Juliano asks Mahmoud “what do you think of the suicides? Don’t hide behind 
Yousef,” to which Mahmoud laughs and responds “what do I think?” and 
pauses.105 It is not clear whether Mahmoud did then respond, as the 
documentary cuts to the next scene – however, from an editing standpoint, no 
more was needed to illustrate the argument of the documentary. The recurring 
motif of the loss of childhood innocence is also seen in the final scene of the 
documentary, wherein a group of young children chant:  
Answer the call from the Aqsa mosque. Call out against those who 
oppress us. For your sake, my steadfast people. Together we will fight 
and struggle. Raise your voice and say: God is great, God is great. Every 
mother’s tear and every drop of blood takes its toll. For every martyr that 
falls, a new one will rise. For your sake, my steadfast people . . .106 
The chant holds a militaristic feeling and sentiment, with its references to 
fighting, blood and martyrdom, which also in-turn implies a relation to Islamist 
militarism, with its theological references. This notion, combined with the 
chanters being children and its placement as the final scene of the 
documentary, suggests that the documentary is implying that the disruption of 
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childhood innocence by violence has already begun anew with the next 
generation of Palestinian children. The overall tone of the documentary is 
ultimately one of regret or remorse that the situation had come to this, and that 
violence had to be the outcome. 
In so far as Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict is concerned, Arna’s 
Children is thus less focussed on challenging Israel and more on challenging 
violence as a Palestinian response or solution. As such, condemnation of the 
policies and actions of Israel – a core focus of a typical Palestinian narrative – is 
not particularly explicit in the documentary. The “Israeli-Palestinian Conflict” is 
never mentioned explicitly, with references only and instead to the Israeli 
“occupation.”107 Furthermore, certain aspects of the occupation are only shown 
as part of the mise-en-scène – the backdrop to the argument against violence. 
For instance, the documentary opens with the camera driving down a road 
alongside a long line of cars stopped by Israeli soldiers; protesters, Arna Mer 
Khamis amongst them, hold Hebrew and Arabic signs reading “down with the 
occupation” and disrupt other traffic.108 Only through familiarity with the Israeli 
occupation is it clear that this is an instance of Israeli restriction of Palestinian 
freedom of movement, where the Palestinian traffic has been halted for the sole 
purpose of disruption whilst Israeli traffic has been allowed to pass.109 In this 
regard, the documentary is technically showing the reality for Palestinians living 
under Israeli occupation. However, the purpose of the scene is not to display 
the Israeli occupation, but to introduce the character of Arna. Juliano Mer 
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Khamis, narrating, opens by stating “this is my mother, Arna” and gives a brief 
biography, within which mentioning only “the closure on the refugee camp of 
Jenin.”110 The camera largely follows Arna throughout the scene. The scene is 
intended to establish Arna as a staunch pro-Palestinian activist, advocating for 
the people of Jenin even in sickness, and it is through this lens that the 
Palestinian peoples’ plight is shown. 
Despite not making it an explicit focus, however, Arna’s Children still 
deals with Israeli policy and thus subscribes to a particular analytical paradigm. 
Whilst, by the time the documentary was released, the dominant Palestinian 
narrative had shifted its argument to emphasise the Settler-Colonial and 
Apartheid paradigms, Arna’s Children still used the paradigm of military 
occupation. With the framing centred around the Second Intifada and the core 
anti-violence argument, the documentary holds up the conflict between the 
Israelis and Palestinians as a defining feature of their relationship. The key 
event around which the documentary is based is referred to widely by the 
voices in the documentary as the “Battle of Jenin.” It is apparent that both the 
Israeli and Palestinian sides typically refer to the Israeli invasion of Jenin as a 
“Battle” – for Israelis, it was part of Operation Defensive Shield, a military 
response to increasing numbers of suicide bombings by Palestinian militant 
groups.111 There have been some on the Palestinian side, however, that have 
referred to the Battle of Jenin as a massacre, or the scene of war crimes.112 
Israeli news media argues that European – particularly British – news outlets at 
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the time were quick to make these claims of massacres and war crimes without 
proper substantiation, whilst Israel failed to share their side of the story.113 
Former theatre child Zakaria Zubeidi, now leader of al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades 
in Jenin during the fighting, also argued against referring to the Battle as a 
massacre, stating during the documentary itself that “the Battle of Jenin has 
become a myth. Now they say the Jews massacred us. That’s not true,” 
highlighting the extent to which those involved on the ground in Jenin adhered 
to the Conflict paradigm.114 Israelis, most commonly represented by soldiers, 
are often not referred to as a foreign force in the documentary, but commonly as 
“the army,” implying to some extent that they are the sovereign (or at least 
military) ruler.115 This notion is highlighted by Arna in one early scene, as one of 
the theatre children refers to “the army” and Arna presses him to specify “the 
Israeli army.”116 Furthermore, one of the theatre children, Ala, in arguing with 
another fighter during the Second Intifada, exclaims that “when we surrendered, 
the resistance ended.” 117 The use of the term “resistance” is significant, as it 
implicitly characterises the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict as something of a civil, 
rather than international, war and thus again presents Israel as the sovereign 
establishment, rather than a foreign force – Israel is the army, and the 
Palestinian militant groups are the rebels. 
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The primary way through which the documentary creates otherness, separating 
Israel from Palestine, is when the voices refer to “Jews.” A scene in which 
Juliano Mer Khamis converses with a few of the boys from the theatre 
particularly demonstrates this notion: 
I wanted to understand why [Arna had] come here. What her aim was. . . 
. 
What did you think of her? 
That she was Jewish. We thought she wasn’t good. When we got to 
know her, we saw she was very good to us. . . . 
We thought you [Juliano] were spying for the occupation, but then we got 
to know you. . . . But we realised you were on our side. . . . 
I thought: why isn’t there an Arab who would do this for us? Why would 
Jews, who are enemies of the Arabs, why would they do all this for us? 
118 
There is a resultant apparent dichotomy, in which the Israelis are both the Other 
– Jews, enemies of the Arabs – and the same society – the establishment. All of 
this creates a distinction in the documentary between the Israeli system, which 
is presented as part of the same sovereign body, and the Israeli people, who 
are treated as a foreign body – not even referred to as Israeli, but as “Jews” 
predominantly. Although, the common denominator is that Israel exists as a 
military occupier. Ultimately, Arna’s Children demonstrates a disconnect with 
the growing consensus of the dominant Palestinian narrative, as the voices in 
the documentary – all either ordinary Palestinians or grassroots activists – 
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subscribe to the more-traditional, conflict-orientated perspective of the Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict. 
 Overall, Arna’s Children represents the origins of a non-dominant 
Palestinian narrative, formed separately from the dominant Palestinian narrative 
and the wider Israeli-Palestinian discourse. In narrating the Palestinian 
experience, Juliano Mer Khamis instead drew from the personal experiences of 
his mother, Arna, and the Palestinian children they supported, as well as his 
own experiences, to inform how he narrated the Palestinian perspective. What 
resulted was a narrative that demonstrated some of the nuances seen at a 
localised level, but often overlook by the broader dominant Israeli and 
Palestinian narratives, that also expressed sorrow for the violence that ruptured 
from the ongoing conflict. The documentary highlights the two key arguments of 
what would become the Freedom Theatre narrative – the challenge to Israel, as 
well as the challenge to Palestinian society. What the audience is ultimately 
presented with is an introspective narrative, interested (perhaps more so) in 
finding and challenging the roots of the internal problems facing Palestinians, as 
well as continuing to stand against Israeli occupation. 
 
Zakaria Zubeidi 
 Zubeidi, born in 1976, was one of the few of Arna’s Children to survive 
the Second Intifada.119 Having been military leader of al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Bridges 
in Jenin during the Battle, he was one of Israel’s most wanted.120 In an 
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interview, Zubeidi traced his militancy back to the death of his mother, who was 
killed by an Israeli sniper in 2002, during the Second Intifada.121 When he co-
founded the Freedom Theatre in 2006, Zubeidi was still wanted by the Israelis, 
and remained in hiding in order to avoid arrest and numerous assassination 
attempts.122 His involvement in the Theatre gave legitimacy to what was seen 
by many in Jenin to be a foreign concept.123 Zubeidi then took an amnesty in 
2007, removing him from Israel’s most wanted list, in exchange for him laying 
down his arms.124 According to the Associated Press, he still never surrendered 
his weapons to the Palestinian Authority, as he did not trust the amnesty 
agreement and feared for his life.125 Zubeidi had, however, reportedly already 
decided to pursue non-violent and cultural, rather than armed, resistance, being 
quoted as saying “through the theatre, you can talk to the world and give a 
different message than the way they see us as terrorists.”126 Armed resistance 
had been a means of sending a message to the world that the Palestinians 
were fighting the occupation, but cultural resistance provided a way of 
contextualising that resistance, to inform others of the reasons behind it.127 For 
Zubeidi, the idea for the Freedom Theatre was based on his experiences with 
Arna’s Stone Theatre – the time he spent there had been one of the happiest of 
his life, when the children “felt like real people, people who mattered.”128 
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The Cultural Intifada 
 The two core narrative strands formed in Arna’s Children – the challenge 
to Israel and the challenge to Palestinian society – then continue into the 
establishment of the Freedom Theatre. In 2006, Juliano Mer Khamis returned to 
Jenin and founded the Freedom Theatre after Zubeidi appealed to him to create 
a project to support the next generation of young people.129 The new theatre 
committed itself to what Mer Khamis called the “Cultural Intifada.” In defining the 
Cultural Intifada, Erin Mee quotes Mer Khamis as saying: 
The Freedom Theatre . . . is a venue to join the Palestinian people in 
their struggle for liberation with poetry, music, theatre, cameras. The 
Israelis succeeded to destroy our identity [and] our social structures, 
[both] political [and] economical. Our duty as artists is to rebuild or 
reconstruct this destruction. Who we are, why we are, where we are 
going, who we want to be. . . . We believe that the third intifada, the 
coming intifada, should be cultural, with poetry, music, theatre, cameras, 
and magazines.130 
The Cultural Intifada takes an introspective approach, challenging Israel’s 
destruction of Palestine not only by directly confronting them, but also by 
restating what it means to be Palestinian besides the Israelis’ Other. In this 
regard, the Cultural Intifada attempts to straddle the two narrative strands 
present in the Freedom Theatre’s narrative. The content of the Freedom 
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Theatre’s Cultural Intifada narrative is inherently anti-Zionist, incorporating 
themes of Israeli occupation, violence and domination. However, this narrative 
equally does not shy away from highlighting issues within the Palestinian 
political climate, or challenging Palestinian societal and cultural norms that are 
seen as outdated in a modern (Western) context. It takes the idea of defining or 
restating Palestinian identity as a necessary starting point in challenging Israeli 
dominance. This attempt to challenge both Israel and Palestine also created 
contention with the dominant Palestinian narrative, however. Although not the 
only group to advocate for cultural resistance, according to Shatz: 
The theatre’s stance was unusually radical for an NGO in Palestine. It 
refused to criticise the armed struggle, or to parrot the PA’s rhetoric 
about the peace process, positions that lost it some potential funding. It 
attacked the PA’s collaboration with Israel, and described itself as part of 
a struggle against occupation rather than another ‘capacity-building’ 
organisation.131 
The binary, polarised nature of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict does not leave 
much room for pronounced counterarguments, especially as this is seen as 
counterproductive to the primary goal of achieving Palestinian liberation, within 
which Israel is the ultimate antagonist. The discourse between the Freedom 
Theatre and the dominant Palestinian narrative, in this case, ultimately led to 
the murder/assassination of Juliano Mer Khamis. 
Within the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict’s dominant canon, the Cultural 
Intifada is not recognised; the official chronology only formally recognises the 
First and Second Intifadas. Nevertheless, the Freedom Theatre, and 
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proponents of the organisation and theatre more-widely, promoted the Cultural 
Intifada and it was thus picked up by academics and news organisations. In 
2009, Reuters published an article titled “In self-satire, Palestinians see cultural 
Intifada,” covering the Freedom Theatre’s adaptation of George Orwell’s Animal 
Farm and the response to this.132 The Cultural Intifada is presented at most as 
an event to come or that could be, rather than an incipient revolution. According 
to the article, the Theatre sought to begin an Intifada divorced from the violence 
of the previous Intifadas, instead emphasising culture and challenging a lack of 
progress within Palestinian leadership and conservative social norms, which 
saw hostility from portions of Palestinian society, wherein criticism “is often 
branded pro-Israeli treachery,” or by those who see them as a threat to 
Palestinian culture, culminating in an unclaimed arson attack against the 
Theatre.133 Effectively, the Freedom Theatre received backlash for challenging 
the dominant Palestinian narrative. 
The plays the Freedom Theatre have put on throughout their history have 
largely balanced the two core narrative strands of the Cultural Intifada. The 
presentation and synopses of the plays listed on the Freedom Theatre website 
show a rough fifty-fifty split in focus outwardly on Israel and inwardly on 
Palestine.134 However, certain productions garner more attention than others, 
and it is with these higher-profile plays that the Freedom Theatre’s narrative – 
or at least the perception of this narrative – was formed. Naturally, the plays that 
received more attention were seen as more incendiary within Palestinian 
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society; it is not surprising that the theatre faced arson in response to its 
production of Animal Farm, an allegory regarding political corruption and the 
derailment of political change. The Theatre’s two previous productions – To Be 
or Not to Be and The Journey – both closely related to one another, dealt with 
“the joys, troubles and dreams of youth in Occupied Palestine” – an approach 
inherently focussed on Israel’s impact and much less controversial within 
Palestinian circles.135 The Theatre’s adaptation of Animal Farm, on the other 
hand, in their own words: 
Stays true to Orwell’s fierce critique of revolutionaries imitating their 
oppressors. The head pig, Napoleon, flanks himself with two black-clad, 
Kalashnikov-toting dogs with sunglasses. After moving into the farmer’s 
house, Napoleon hangs a giant portrait of himself in a dark suit and tie 
above the farmyard. The human who comes to talk business at the play’s 
end wears a green army uniform and speaks Hebrew.136 
Whilst not explicitly stating so in their synopsis, the Freedom Theatre openly 
acknowledges its intent to compare the current Palestinian leadership to the 
Israelis and draw attention to the collaboration between the two governments. In 
a video teaser for the play, those speaking, including Mer Khamis, warn those in 
power “that there is a possibility, if we’re not careful to follow our principles and 
our political stands, we’ll end up killing each other, persecuting, charging and 
imprisoning each other, and locking each other up – we’ll end up as in Animal 
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Farm.”137 They also go as far as to argue that this is already taking place, with 
one of the actors stating that “our play is a reflection of our society. It presents 
our reality. The pigs took over the farm and became like Mr Jones. Nothing has 
changed.”138 There is additionally a warning against a wider shift in Palestinian 
attitude from collective cooperation to individual selfishness, wherein the play 
“shows you how they are corrupt, why they are corrupt in the play, because they 
start to talk about me, not we; and we lost we, we don’t have we in Palestine, 
we just have me – ‘I did this,’ ‘I will do this.’”139 The play goes beyond only 
challenging Palestinian political institutions, to challenging the general 
Palestinian psyche; in this sense, it is the audience that is directly called out by 
the play. The aforementioned Reuters article corroborates this notion, arguing 
that the arson attack in response to the play “was a reminder that some take 
offense at what they see as a challenge to tradition or to their hold over the 
West Bank” – it is not only the societal structures that feel under attack, but 
what it means to be Palestinian.140 The article quotes Mer Khamis as referring 
to this concept and hostility as a “ghetto mentality” and “dictatorship of 
tradition.”141 A BBC article on the play states that Mer Khamis aimed to look at 
Palestinian society and politics particularly, rather than Israel, and the 
“unspoken restrictions” internally imposed on Palestinian citizens’ freedoms.142 
However, another article from The National News quotes Mer Khamis as saying 
“that’s what is beautiful about theatre, everyone can interpret it his own way . . . 
I don’t agree that the [Palestinian Authority] are pigs. I think the PA is caught in 
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a situation that affects all of us. . . . Many of them are aware of the political 
situation they are in, and are open-minded about it.”143 In this regard, for Mer 
Khamis, highlighting the corruption and stagnation seen within Palestinian 
politics was less about challenging Palestinian politicians personally, but more-
so reflecting and raising awareness of the problems inherent in the system itself 
– something the politicians are then a product of. Equally, however, within the 
play itself, political corruption is personified in the character of Napoleon, 
ascribing the antagonism to the politician, rather than the system. With the 
production made up of many people, Mer Khamis is also not the only voice 
narrating the Freedom Theatre narrative and it is apparent that many of these 
other voices do not distinguish between the political system and its politicians. 
Another of the Freedom Theatre’s productions, Alice in Wonderland – 
which ran from January to March 2011, a week before Mer Khamis’ murder – 
demonstrates that the Freedom Theatre was not only incidentally ruffling 
feathers, but at times aspired to be controversial.144 A post on the Freedom 
Theatre website recognises the dual-focus of the Cultural Intifada as a driving 
force in the play, writing “Mer-Khamis created a production that functions on two 
levels: the first challenges traditional aspects of camp life and the second is an 
overt critique of the Israeli occupation.”145 However, the play itself appears to 
lean much more heavily towards challenging Palestinian culture, with the 
dynamic between the Red Queen and her subjects providing only an implicit 
allegory for the Israeli occupation.146 The Freedom Theatre itself poses the 
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question of whether the play’s oppressors represent Israel or “the camp’s 
traditionalists.”147 The play emphasises its use of the story of Alice in 
Wonderland to explore a woman’s role and rights in Palestinian society: 
Alice escapes a reality of poverty, oppression and conservatism where 
she is constrained to doing chores in the home. . . . Alice realizes that the 
other world, which purports to be the real one, is the one where she is 
robbed of her freedom. As she journeys through Wonderland, she grows 
and learns how to make her own choices. . . . the performance shines a 
different spotlight on today’s Palestinian society. . . . [It] manages to 
tackle issues such as the position of girls and women in the community, 
while simultaneously questioning many of the social restrictions that limit 
the roles available to both women and men.148 
The webpage for the production describes the play as “subversive” and 
“radical,” and quotes Mer Khamis as saying “it will be our biggest scandal yet, I 
hope.”149 The Theatre used its challenge to Palestinian society and its 
subversion of societal norms not only as a narrative stance, but as a selling 
point. 
 The direct challenge the Freedom Theatre narrative presented to the 
dominant Palestinian narrative led to an extreme climax beyond the scope of 
theoretical discourse. On the 4th April 2011, Mer Khamis was killed in his car by 
a masked gunman outside of the Freedom Theatre.150 The specifics 
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surrounding Mer Khamis’ death are murky; however, there were assumptions 
and expectations surrounding the cause of his death that are worth exploring.151 
Three years prior to his death, in 2008, Mer Khamis said during a video 
commonly presented as an interview: 
I’m telling them about how I’m going to end my life – a bullet from a 
fucked up Palestinian, who’s going to be very angry that we are in Jenin 
with this blonde [his wife, Jenny Nyman], coming to corrupt the youth of 
the Islam, and he’s gonna [miming gunshots and death] and she’s going 
to find me dead on the doorstep.152 
The instance of the video found for this thesis was taken from Channel 10 
News, an Israeli television news organisation, and uploaded to a pro-Israeli 
YouTube channel consisting of selective news clips presenting Palestinians and 
Arabs in a negative light – the news segment and video clip were aired and 
uploaded on the 7th April 2011, days after Mer Khamis’ death. The use of the 
video by these two Israeli sources immediately demonstrates how Mer Khamis’ 
death was capitalised-upon by the Israeli narrative to damage Palestinian 
credibility.153 Mer Khamis’ statement, however, comes across somewhat as a 
joke, with the hyperbolic miming and Mer Khamis’ smile to his wife as he says 
that she will find him dead, although there is equally a hint of belief in Mer 
Khamis’ demeanour with his pauses, exasperated tone and body language as 
he talks about the motives of his imagined killer; in this regard, the miming is 
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almost used to revive the jokey tone and pace. A Guardian article corroborates 
Mer Khamis’ frequent envisioning of “his death at the hand of ‘a crazy 
Palestinian gunman,’” also suggesting that this video clip was not simply an 
isolated joke.154 Mer Khamis understood that his and the Freedom Theatre’s 
narrative constituted a provocative counternarrative to the dominant Palestinian 
narrative. 
The Freedom Theatre itself seemed to subscribe to the idea that the killer was 
Palestinian, writing in a 7th April 2011 post on their website that “a traitor’s hand 
shot and killed” Mer Khamis.155 In line with Mer Khamis’ and the Theatre’s 
perception of his likely death, by some accounts, he was killed by Mujahed 
Qaniri, “a former Al-Aqsa Brigades’ militant.”156 The Guardian, visiting Jenin 
following Mer Khamis’ death, used a circulated leaflet and vox populi interviews 
to assert that criticisms were made of Mer Khamis and the Theatre as 
proponents of liberal values, and these were suggested by these sources to be 
the impetus for his murder.157 In this regard, at the very least, Mer Khamis’ 
death was viewed as positive in the eyes of some Palestinians, at least in 
conservative circles. Regardless of the genuine circumstances, according to 
Haaretz, after Mer Khamis’ death, Palestinian and PNA president Mahmoud 
Abbas also posthumously awarded Mer Khamis a “Medal of Jerusalem,” 
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referring to him as a “martyr.”158 This is significant as the label of “martyr” is 
inherently symbolic; a “martyr” is reduced to a symbol of a broad idea – in this 
case, the “Palestinian cause” – and thus stripped of nuance – in this case, 
criticism of the Palestinian government and repressive social norms through 
Freedom Theatre performances. Through this declaration, the dominant 
Palestinian narrative was able to adopt Mer Khamis’ superficial image as a 
“martyr” in order to bolster itself whilst omitting the counternarrative he had 
created. Generally, people expected and were willing to believe that Mer 
Khamis’ death was linked to his open countering of the dominant Palestinian 
narrative through the Theatre, regardless of the truth of the matter. In this 
regard, Mer Khamis’ death was pre-narrativised; it was known that the Freedom 
Theatre was seen as controversial by some, there had been previous attacks 
against the Theatre, and it was anticipated by Mer Khamis himself and others 
that he would die by the hands of a disgruntled Palestinian. There was an 
atmosphere surrounding his death that suggested that this outcome was 
expected or, at least, not surprising. The Freedom Theatre was openly 
countering the dominant Palestinian narrative, and recognised the danger in 
this. 
After the death of Mer Khamis, academic articles were published 
reflecting on Mer Khamis and his legacy, treating the Cultural Intifada with 
increasing seriousness.159 The Cultural Intifada stands in contrast to the 
dominant understanding of “intifada,” however. “Intifada” (إنتفاضة) literally 
translates to “uprising,” holding the connotations of a revolt.160 These 
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connotations are upheld by the dominant Israeli and Palestinian canons, with 
the natures of the First and Second Intifadas. Other iterations of the “Third 
Intifada” have been argued for alongside this Cultural Intifada iteration. Two 
examples are the violent unrest in Jerusalem in 2014 – which was nicknamed 
primarily the “Silent Intifada” – and the 2015-2016 wave of violence, again 
centred predominantly around Jerusalem – primarily nicknamed the “Intifada of 
the Individuals.”161 In these cases, the application of the “intifada” label was 
instigated by the Israeli narrative. A Jerusalem Post article from 2014 
emphasised the agreement of Jerusalem’s Israeli politicians that the “third 
intifada is a foregone conclusion.”162 The article relies on two Israeli Jerusalem 
councilmen who represent opposing sides of the Zionist political spectrum. The 
underlying perspective shared by the two is effectively the same – the 
applicability of the “intifada” label is granted by the increased perception of 
violence and the risk to Israeli citizens. Given the specific utilisation of the word 
“intifada” in the canonised First and Second Intifadas to represent a nationalised 
struggle to “shake off” Israeli control over Palestine, the association within the 
Israeli psyche of Palestinian aggressiveness and the term “intifada” dilutes its 
meaning to be synonymous with violence. In this regard, the First and Second 
Intifadas act as precedents for understanding the “intifada” label; however, this 
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interpretation ignores the Palestinians’ rationale behind these uprisings, instead 
basing itself on the Israeli experience and witnessing of violence. 
The use of the “intifada” label for the Cultural Intifada, conversely, demands a 
broadening of the definition to encompass non-confrontational, long-term 
processes of cultural re-establishment and protection – in stark contrast to the 
typical imagery of an uprising – as is the stated aim and intention of the Cultural 
Intifada.163 The “Cultural Intifada” has also been treated as part of a growing 
trend in Palestinian resistance along these lines. Mee states that “while there 
are other theatres in the West Bank . . . The Freedom Theatre, Alrowwad, and 
ASHTAR devote themselves specifically to what The Freedom Theatre calls a 
‘cultural intifada,’ and what Alrowwad calls ‘beautiful resistance,’” going as far 
as to explicitly endorse the existence of the event by signing off “the cultural 
intifada continues…”164 An article by Dasha Tanner from 2014 then – despite 
presenting itself as a question of the existence of “a Third Cultural Intifada” – 
treats it as entirely canonical and perhaps inevitable, and situates the Freedom 
Theatre’s concept in the existing discourse of Palestinian cultural identity, also 
canonising Edward Said and the cultural writings of Palestinian activist and 
Christian pastor Mitri Rahed within the umbrella of the “Cultural Intifada.”165 
Gabriel Varghese, like Mee, compared the Cultural Intifada and “beautiful 
resistance” in his 2020 book, creating a commonality between the two in their 
use of the “vocabulary of resistance,” also highlighting that the “theatre-makers 
explicitly assert the contribution the arts can make to the national liberation 
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struggle.”166 The Cultural Intifada not only challenged notions of how 
Palestinians should confront Israel, but also common understandings of the 
labels used in these confrontations. 
 The Cultural Intifada inherently sought to challenge fundamental 
principles seen from both the dominant Israeli and Palestinian narratives. The 
Freedom Theatre attempted, foremostly, to highlight issues and inequalities 
present in Palestinian society, as a starting point for Palestinian resistance to 
Israel. In parallel, the Theatre used the Cultural Intifada to challenge what 
resistance and “intifada” meant, to Israelis and Palestinians alike. What 
continues to be apparent from the time of Arna’s Children is the introspective 
nature of the Freedom Theatre’s narrative. Rather than projecting resistance 
outwardly towards Israel – using demonstrations, for instance – the Cultural 
Intifada creates cultural resistance projects intended to be consumed by 
Palestinians, to challenge their own perspectives. Such an approach, divorced 
from the typical Israel-orientated focus of (dominant) Palestinian narratives, put 
the Freedom Theatre in conflict with these narratives as it attempted to present 
an alternative viewpoint. This challenge then invoked a strong reaction from 
proponents of the dominant Palestinian narrative, effectively as a punitive 
measure against the Theatre’s narrative divergence. 
 
The Theatre after Mer Khamis, and Ben Rivers 
 According to Johanna Wallin, “in the aftermath of [Mer Khamis’] murder, 
[the Freedom Theatre] initially dealt with issues of survival and later of spirited 
revival, and whilst it would have been impossible to resume the work of Juliano, 
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the Freedom Theatre would continue to build on his legacy as well as that of his 
mother’s.”167 The general impression was one of resolve to continue the 
Theatre’s cultural resistance, whatever that would look like – whether that 
meant raising awareness internationally or focussing on bringing the Theatre’s 
ideas to the Palestinian people.168 Continuing Mer Khamis’ legacy would be a 
matter of interpretation. Jacob Gough, an international member of the Freedom 
Theatre since 2008, described Mer Khamis as the “central pillar of the 
organisation at that time, with a large amount of administrative and fundraising 
support from his wife Jenny.”169 Mer Khamis personally handled many of the 
relationships with donors and partner organisations, and these needed to be 
maintained.170 The Theatre had to build a management and decision-making 
structure for the different departments and the Theatre overall.171 Leadership 
was effectively decentralised. Members of the Theatre became fearful for their 
lives, as threats were made; investigations launched into the murder by both the 
PA and Israelis led to members of the Theatre being detained and arrested.172 
Fundamentally, the Freedom Theatre needed to prove it was still going.173 
Zubeidi, later in 2011, was informed that Israel had revoked his amnesty 
pardon and was arrested in 2012 by the PA, only released five months later, 
after going on hunger strike and with pressure from supporters 
internationally.174 Zubeidi returned to prison in 2013, on the advice of the PA, 
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after Israel made threats against his life; his amnesty was reinstated in 2017, 
although Israel arrested him again in 2019.175 During this time, Zubeidi was 
appointed director of the Palestinian Ministry of Prisoners’ Affairs by the PA.176 
Most recently, in 2021, he escaped prison alongside five other Palestinian 
prisoners, although was recaptured and transferred to a hospital to treat injuries 
inflicted by Israeli beatings.177 
 Ben Rivers was brought into the Freedom Theatre in 2011 to coordinate 
the Freedom Bus and “other community-based projects that utilize interactive 
theatre for advocacy, activism and alliance building.”178 The Bus initiative, 
developed from an earlier playback theatre programme, represented the 
Freedom Theatre’s strongest effort to bring their work to all Palestinians, 
expanding their scope beyond the Jenin area.179 Rivers is an Australian theatre 
practitioner who has, according to the Freedom Theatre website, worked with a 
“broad range of communities impacted by structural oppression, political 
violence and collective trauma.”180 He holds a Masters in Counselling 
Psychology, with a concentration in Drama Therapy, and a PhD in Peace 
Studies.181 Rivers is also Co-Director of the Arab School of Playback Theatre, 
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Lebanon, and Executive Director of Dawar for Arts and Development, Egypt, 
being an accredited Playback Theatre Trainer through the Centre for Playback 
Theatre, New York.182 Academically, Rivers has published extensively on 
Playback Theatre as a tool for cultural resistance and social change.183 As 
opposed to Mer Khamis or Zubeidi, who have personal connections to Palestine 
and Jenin particularly, Rivers comes in as a foreign expert, although familiar 
with theatrical method, activism and the Middle East. Rivers very much appears 
to be motivated along these lines, explaining that “the inclusion of theatre, 
music and song connects us to the creative forces that sustain a people and 
their struggles.”184 
 
The Freedom Bus 
Where Arna’s Children and the Cultural Intifada demonstrate a 
Palestinian counternarrative interested in challenging Israel, but introspective-
enough to reflect on the negative forces within Palestine that upset such a 
challenge, the Freedom Bus represents a noticeable divergence. The balance 
between the two narrative strands enshrined in the Cultural Intifada is tipped in 
favour of directly challenging Israel. Whilst the Bus’ mission statement to 
promote cultural resistance by using “interactive theatre and cultural activism to 
bear witness, raise awareness and build alliances throughout occupied 
Palestine and beyond” shows a continued emphasis for the Theatre on cultural 
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resistance (as opposed to violent, implicitly), the Bus’ own emphasis is on, 
firstly, challenging Israel itself and, secondly, on providing those Palestinians it 
visits with the tools to use cultural resistance to challenge Israel themselves. 185 
The Bus explicitly states that it “promotes cultural resistance . . . to give voice to 
life under occupation.”186 The emphasis is placed on the Israeli occupation as 
the mantel to be overcome. Fundamentally, the Freedom Bus represents a 
significant shift in the Freedom Theatre narrative as it converges sharply with 
the dominant Palestinian narrative. 
A 2012 Press Release gives an insight into the rationale behind the creation of 
the Freedom Bus and the divergence from previous iterations of the Freedom 
Theatre narrative. The statement lists several challenges the initiative faced in 
the year leading up to its launch, including the death of Mer Khamis and the 
imprisonment of Zubeidi, alongside continuing harassment by the Israeli army, 
and separately states that the project “comes amidst widespread social unrest 
in the West Bank.”187 The death of Mer Khamis meant that the Freedom 
Theatre lost its main narrative figurehead; whilst his voice was rarely omitted 
from the output of the Theatre previously, there now existed a vacuum for a 
leading voice. The apparent result is that leadership of the Freedom Theatre 
and its peripherals decentralised. The Freedom Bus itself was created and lead 
by Ben Rivers, who is mentioned in Freedom Bus blog posts, listed on the 
Freedom Theatre website and included in a Freedom Theatre YouTube video 
as the “initiator,” “project leader” and “bus driver” for the Freedom Bus 
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initiative.188 The YouTube video appears to show Rivers actually in Israel-
Palestine, and the blogpost ‘Day #1’ states that “after breakfast with a view at 
the guesthouse [Freedom Ride participants] moved on to our Theatre School 
facilities for some relaxed and fun ice-breakers and team building activities, led 
by Ben Rivers,” demonstrating the extent of his involvement.189 The Freedom 
Bus thus represents the growth in influence of outside voices within the 
Freedom Theatre narrative. 
Significantly, the Freedom Bus sacrifices the challenges to Palestinian 
society seen in the Cultural Intifada for a much more explicit and focussed 
critique of the Israeli occupation. Perhaps again related to the loss of Mer 
Khamis’ leading voice in the Theatre narrative, the Cultural Intifada is 
mentioned only once explicitly in the Freedom Bus’ blogposts.190 In the 2015 
post, the Bus writes that, in connection with the Theatre’s then-forthcoming 
anniversary, “over the past decade, we have devoted ourselves to what our co-
founder, the late Juliano Mer Khamis, called the ‘Cultural Intifada’ – a 
movement that harnesses the force of creativity and artistic expression in the 
quest for freedom, justice and equality.”191 The description here simplifies and 
abstracts the original intent of the Cultural Intifada, defined by Mer Khamis 
himself in his messaging in Arna’s Children and through the Freedom Theatre’s 
earlier productions, instead taking freedom, justice and equality as universal 
notions – applied in the Freedom Bus’ case to the Israeli occupation. The 
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Cultural Intifada became less an ongoing event and more an idealistic notion 
left behind by Mer Khamis.192 
Such a notion may have in fact been Mer Khamis’ goal, however. In October 
2011, four of the Theatre’s students were interviewed for Sampsonia Way, an 
arts-based magazine.193 The journalist writes that: 
I told them that I wanted to do a profile on Juliano, one that would go 
deeper than a recitation of the publicly-known facts of his life. I said that I 
wanted to hear their stories about him. The response I got was an 
emphatic “no.” Batoul [one of the students] explained the reasoning 
behind the troupe’s decision: “The problem is people keep asking for the 
same stories, and we’re not going to immediately cry for them and say 
‘Yeah, I’ve been beaten, Juliano was murdered, everything is so horrible’ 
and cry and be pitiable.” . . . The four actors asked that they be able to 
talk about the future, not the past.194 
The students highlight two main concerns with Mer Khamis’ legacy. Firstly, 
there was the misinterpretation of his work and aim, which was not to establish 
a children’s theatre, but to present, enable and expand “quality Palestinian 
theatre” as a means of emphasising Palestinian culture.195 Secondly, the 
graduates faced pressure to remain a part of the Freedom Theatre: “There is a 
fixation on Juliano’s past, on what he completed before he died. . . . Juliano did 
establish an acting school in Jenin—an admirable achievement—but after 
talking to Moe’men and Eyad it became clear that the school was only one step 
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towards Juliano’s goal.”196 In this regard, a divergence away from pursuing the 
Cultural Intifada as a canonical event, but instead approaching it as one 
person’s idea to build upon, may be more constructive than becoming 
entrenched solely in the past. Mee, who the Sampsonia article identifies as a 
friend of Mer Khamis, also reflected that “to his students, audiences, and 
admirers Mer Khamis leaves the legacy of the Jasmine Revolution and the 
freedom to perform.”197 The emphasis is again on the expansion of and access 
to Palestinian theatre, not on the Freedom Theatre itself. 
The article also quotes the Freedom Theatre’s students, speaking at Mer 
Khamis’ funeral, as saying “your children are going to stay, following your path 
on the way to the freedom battle, and we will go on with your revolution’s 
promise: the Jasmine Revolution.”198 The interchange of the term “Cultural 
Intifada” for “Jasmine Revolution” is significant, as it further reduces the Cultural 
Intifada to a smaller facet of the MENA-wide Arab Spring – a discourse even 
broader than the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict – ignited by the Jasmine Revolution 
in Tunisia, originating on the 17th December 2010.199 The Jasmine Revolution 
itself was specific to the Tunisian context, but the wider Arab Spring held 
universal values and notions, and a sense of unity that transcended national 
borders.200 The Arab Springs are mentioned by the Freedom Bus itself as early 
as February 2012, writing at one point that “for The Freedom Theatre, this was 
a unique opportunity to participate directly in the greater dialogue surrounding 
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civil resistance, popular struggle and democratic reform in the region.”201 The 
Freedom Theatre students’ equation of the Cultural Intifada to the Arab Spring, 
then, situates it as a nationally-specific movement embodying pan-Arab values 
of greater cultural and societal freedom – the cultural destruction Mer Khamis 
sought to undo was no longer only an issue of Israeli occupation, but of regional 
political norms. Such an understanding may be expected, considering the 
Theatre’s belief that Mer Khamis died at the hands of a Palestinian, rather than 
Israeli. Overall, the fundamental change within the Freedom Theatre/Freedom 
Bus narrative, and the distinction created from previous iterations of the 
Freedom Theatre’s narrative, is the slight focal and tonal shift. Rather than 
representing an introspective Palestinian narrative, the Freedom Bus 
represented an extrospective Israeli counternarrative, also concerned and 
imbued with wider regional issues. Without the presence of Mer Khamis, the 
Freedom Theatre/Bus narrative became a communal effort, led by multiple 
voices. 
 Rather than seeing an immediate cut-off or ontological shift, the Freedom 
Bus’ relation to the dominant Palestinian narrative also changed over time. 
What started as a counternarrative changed focus and then increasingly 
converged with the dominant Palestinian perspective as it adopted more 
concepts and terms from the dominant paradigms. In 2012, the year of the first 
Freedom Ride, the Freedom Bus’ narrative was broadly focussed on the 
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practicalities of the occupation. The Bus’ blog post for its first day, on the 24th 
September, opens by saying: 
Today the Freedom Bus visited the small village of Faquaa. Although the 
town’s name means spring water bubbles, it has been a long time since 
the villagers had easy access to clean water. Since Israel erected the 
separation barrier, the inhabitants of Faquaa have been cut off from their 
land and can no longer use their traditional underground springs.202 
The post goes on to give specifics about Israeli water access and allocation 
before going on to discuss the Freedom Bus’ playback theatre performance, 
specifically inviting them to “share their real-life stories of water shortage.”203 
The Bus pays attention to a particular issue – water access – and seeks to 
explore its impact on a localised level. A second-day blog post focusses on day-
to-day interactions with the Israeli army, for instance writing “the conductor 
asked the audience for story [sic] that linked to the street we were sitting in. A 
woman called Ranin came forward a told a story about an Israeli army incursion 
in Nablus” and sharing another man’s story from 1982.204 The Bus is again 
shown to be pursuing a particular issue, although one different from the 
previous day. Another day-two post focusses on non-violent resistance, Israeli 
arrests and military violence.205 Day three focusses on the enforced separation 
between Gaza and the West Bank, and travel restrictions, as well as Gaza-
 
202 The Freedom Bus, ‘Day One: Stand with Faquaa!’, Freedom Bus: Ride for Justice (2012) 
<https://freedombuspalestine.wordpress.com/2012/09/24/day-1-stand-with-faquaa/> [Accessed 
3rd November 2020]. 
203 The Freedom Bus, ‘Day One: Stand with Faquaa!’. 
204 The Freedom Bus, ‘Day Two: Stand with Nablus!’, Freedom Bus: Ride for Justice (2012) 
<https://freedombuspalestine.wordpress.com/2012/09/25/day-2-stand-with-nablus/> [Accessed 
3rd November 2020]. 
205 The Freedom Bus, ‘Day Two: Stand with Nabi Saleh!’, Freedom Bus: Ride for Justice (2012) 
<https://freedombuspalestine.wordpress.com/2012/09/25/day-2-stand-with-nabi-saleh/> 
[Accessed 3rd November 2020]. 
73 
 
specific issues.206 Day four covered the Israeli wall and the Intifadas.207 Day Six 
covered the Bedouins.208 Day Eight highlights Israeli post-Oslo land 
fragmentation.209 The first Freedom Ride’s content covers a wide range of 
practical issues that Palestinians have to deal with in their day-to-day lives. The 
posts make no reference to the “Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” and does not 
explicitly use either the Settler-Colonial or Apartheid paradigms. Rather than 
concentrating on how to talk about the Conflict, the Bus put its attention towards 
providing a platform upon which to highlight the problems facing varying 
Palestinian communities, with the Bus adapting its activism to match the 
bespoke situation in each community it visited. 
The 2013 Freedom Ride followed the trend set by the first Ride, emphasising 
“unequal access to water resources, violence from settlers, and frequent – and 
sometimes violent – harassment from the Israeli army.”210 An exception is a 
“seminar day,” in which Palestinian academics talked on “the nature of 
apartheid” and colonisation, although this is very much an outlier and ultimately 
not the Bus’ own voice.211 The final post for the 2013 Ride then adopts the 
labels from the dominant Palestinian paradigms, writing that “through Playback 
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Theatre, residents of the Jordan Valley and South Hebron Hills shared personal 
accounts about the realities of life and resistance under settler colonialism, 
military occupation and state-sanctioned apartheid,” setting the scene for the 
following year.212 
In 2014, the Freedom Bus’ narrative undergoes a sharp paradigmal shift. 
The first two posts continue to predominantly follow the same style as was seen 
in 2012 and 2013.213 However, the third-day post demonstrates a clear, 
intentional adoption of the Settler-Colonial paradigm: 
We see Al-Hadedeye in the distance with a settlement lurking in the 
background. Someone in the group suggests to replace the term 
“settlement” by “colony” because the difference is that the former is by 
nature no crime whereas the latter implies usage of force. So this colony 
we are looking at is a[s] ugly and alien looking as all the others built on 
stolen land, taken off the real natives by force and murder.214 
The Freedom Bus undertakes a visible and explicit transformation in its use of 
mainstream Palestinian paradigms, employing language unambiguously 
specific to a colonial perspective. “Settlement” is the label used by the dominant 
Israeli narrative; the crux of the Israelis’ argument for their settlements 
throughout the Conflict’s history is that the land they are occupying was empty 
before they arrived. The argument was and continues to be that these 
settlements were legal and justified. The land fragmentation of the Oslo Accords 
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was plotted by the pro-Israeli side along Israeli settlement lines, with all but one 
of the settlements falling within Area C, designated as under complete Israeli 
control because of a lack of Palestinian presence.215 The UN, which has 
condemned Israeli settlements on multiple occasions, frames them within the 
context of war, presenting them as illegal under the Fourth Geneva Convention 
with its “Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.”216 The dominant 
understanding of “settler” within Israel-Palestine is ultimately channelled through 
the Conflict paradigm. The Settler-Colonial paradigm challenges the hegemonic 
understanding of Israeli settlements, emphasising their inherently colonial 
nature.217 The Freedom Bus also then immediately refers to the Palestinians as 
“natives,” further solidifying the Israeli-Palestinian dynamic as one of coloniser-
colonised, rather than one of two warring sides.218 
The Freedom Bus then refers to Israeli colonies again on day six of the 2014 
Freedom Ride, writing: 
After lunch we take a walk up the mountain where the views are breath-
taking – not only because of the landscape’s beauty, but also because it 
is clearly visible how At-Tuwani is surrounded by a growing number of 
illegal Israeli settlements. These illegal colonies are to be connected if 
the occupation regime gets its way – this means Palestinian communities 
will be further divided and what will be created is comparable to 
Bantustans in apartheid South Africa.219 
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What is also significant in this post is the further adoption of mainstream 
Palestinian paradigms with the comparison of Palestine to Apartheid South 
Africa. This demonstrates not only an adoption of another dominant paradigm, 
but one not obviously prompted by an external voice, as with the Settler-
Colonial paradigm. Day eight sees the Bus write that “two Israeli soldiers are 
supposed to accompany the group of children by foot. Colonist settlers throw 
stones at them, verbally abuse them and hit them,” referring to “colonist settlers” 
again later in the post.220 This instance marks the first in which the colonial 
paradigm is applied to the Israeli people, not just the country’s structures and 
institutions. Day nine sees another significant step, as the Bus refers to 
apartheid not through a Palestinian-South African comparison, but as the 
“reality of our world in which we live,” suggesting that the Apartheid paradigm 
has become a naturalised part of the Freedom Bus narrative.221 On day ten, the 
Freedom Bus writes that “you wouldn’t be able to tell that yet another demolition 
serving the purpose of ethnic cleansing has taken place; for Palestinians this 
has become a daily hurdle to take,” referring as well to apartheid.222 The 
introduction of the phrase “ethnic cleansing” falls within the Settler-Colonial 
paradigm. Pappé, in The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, makes multiple explicit 
links between Israel and colonialism, stating, for instance, that: 
The roots of collective dispossession are, of course, more ancient: 
foreign invaders have used the term (or its equivalents) and practised the 
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concept regularly against indigenous populations, from Biblical times to 
the height of colonialism. . . . The fact that the expellers were newcomers 
to the country, and part of a colonisation project, relates the case of 
Palestine to the colonialist history of ethnic cleansing in North and South 
America, Africa and Australia, where white settlers routinely committed 
such crimes.223 
It is also worth noting that throughout the 2014 Freedom Ride, the Bus 
continued to frequently refer to the Israeli “occupation” – for instance, commonly 
referring to the Israeli Defence Force as the “Israeli Occupation Forces” – 
demonstrating that the Conflict paradigm maintained its presence alongside the 
Settler-Colonial and Apartheid paradigms.224 The Freedom Bus’ eleventh-day 
blogpost perhaps provides the greatest insight into this rapid change in 
narrative. The post talks about the Ride attending a Boycott, Divestment and 
Sanctions (BDS) lecture – a means to, in the words of the Bus, counter the 
“system of occupation, apartheid and colonialism that Israel pursues.”225 The 
link between the Freedom Bus and the BDS movement may prove significant in 
this regard – the BDS website states that the movement pursues ongoing 
justice as “Israel maintains a regime of settler colonialism, apartheid and 
occupation.”226 The BDS page also states that it is inspired by the anti-
Apartheid movement that had been present in South Africa.227 The BDS 
movement was formed in 2005, but especially gained prominence after Israel’s 
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Operation Cast Lead in Gaza in 2009.228 By 2014, Israeli political figures were 
expressing concern over the growing influence of BDS, and the movement saw 
wide-ranging support abroad and from Israelis within Israel.229 It was in this 
same year that the Bus attended the BDS lecture. The 2014 Freedom Ride 
demonstrates a rapid transformation in the Freedom Bus narrative, as it 
transferred from its practical, localised, day-to-day perspective on the Israeli 
occupation to a frame deeply entrenched in the paradigms used by the 
dominant Palestinian narrative. 
The narrative the Freedom Bus presents is also impacted by the many 
voices that contribute to it, however. The Bus’ initial adoption of the Settler-
Colonial paradigm in 2014 was prompted by the suggestion of one of the 
participants on the Freedom Ride. The 2015 Freedom Ride broadly maintained 
the narrative precedent set by the previous year, promoting that “through 
Playback Theatre, community members will share personal accounts about the 
realities of life and struggle under settler colonialism, military occupation and 
structural apartheid.”230 However, the references to the Settler-Colonial and 
Apartheid paradigms are fewer and further between, and much less 
pronounced, compared to the 2014 Ride. That being said, the 2015 Ride also 
features four Arabic-language blog posts, which are much less diplomatic in 
their utilisation of the dominant Palestinian narrative paradigms. The first 
Arabic-language post frames the Israeli occupation as historic ethnic 
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cleansing.231 The second Arabic-language post refers to Israeli colonialism and 
ethnic cleansing, as well as condemning silence from the international 
community.232 The 2015 Ride represents the first clear time that the blog was 
written by multiple voices. Between 2012-2014, the blog appears to have been 
written by the same person throughout the Rides, although the writer appears to 
change each year. 2015, on the other hand, begins with potentially a single 
writer, but then shifts to each post having a different writer partway through the 
Ride.233 Day six explicitly signs-off with “written by Stan Verstraete, 2015 
Freedom Ride coordinator,” with days seven through nine then similarly follow 
suit.234 The 2016 Freedom Ride blogposts then appear to have always intended 
to have multiple writers, with each post individually crediting its authors. Only 
three of the 2016 daily reports make reference to colonisation, apartheid or 
ethnic cleansing.235 The nature of the Freedom Bus’ communicative medium, 
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with blogging’s piecemeal release schedule and potential for multiple authors, 
meant that the Bus’ narrative was difficult to keep consistent unless done so 
with coordination and intent. Without this coordination, and with each author 
free to share their thoughts, the Freedom Bus narrative was instead left at the 
whim of a collection of individual perspectives, with the commonality being a 
familiarity with the dominant Palestinian narrative. This notion is seen most-
clearly during the 2015 Freedom Ride, with its multiple English-language 
authors and Arabic-language author each subscribing to the dominant 
Palestinian narrative paradigms to varying degrees, ranging from some English-
language posts not mentioning any paradigmal terms whatsoever to the Arabic-
language posts employing the paradigms explicitly and unforgivingly. The result 
is that, whilst there is an overall trend of the Freedom Bus narrative increasingly 
converging with the dominant Palestinian narrative, the level to which the Bus’ 
narrative mimics this dominant narrative varies wildly between each 
communicative instance. 
Overall, the Freedom Bus demonstrates a marked divergence from the 
norms established in the Freedom Theatre’s narrative by Arna’s Children and 
the Cultural Intifada. Perhaps the most understated, but most significant, 
change was the shift from an introspective Palestinian counternarrative to an 
extrospective Israeli counternarrative, much more in line with the dominant 
Palestinian narrative; a notion especially seen in the Bus’ adoption of the 
Settler-Colonial and Apartheid paradigms. The Bus initiative represented a 
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break from the typical modus operandi of the Freedom Theatre, using a new 
theatrical method, travelling to other Palestinian communities and intentionally 
hosting a platform for this work aimed at an international audience. The 
Freedom Bus also demonstrates, however, that its adoption of the dominant 
Palestinian paradigms was not an immediate instance, but a gradual and 
inconsistent process as the dominant Palestinian narrative’s influence grew 
over time and the Freedom Bus adapted its own perspective. 
 
Conclusion 
 A transformation can be traced through the Freedom Theatre’s history 
and accompanying narrative that highlights the challenges posed against a 
Palestinian narrator as they attempt to navigate the existing Israeli-Palestinian 
discourse. Juliano Mer Khamis and the Freedom Theatre originally presented a 
counternarrative to the dominant Palestinian perspective. Arna’s Children 
represents the organic growth of the narrative, whereby Mer Khamis’ personal 
experiences with his mother, Arna’s, “Learning and Freedom” project, and the 
human impact of the Second Intifada and violence on the people of Jenin, 
informed the perspective that Mer Khamis then carried into the creation of the 
Freedom Theatre. The creation of the Freedom Theatre then saw the birth of 
the “Cultural Intifada,” following an argument for creative resistance, rather than 
violent. This approach was coupled with a dual-argument that in order to 
challenge the Israeli occupation, Palestinians must also challenge the 
destruction of their culture – the “occupation of the mind” and its accompanying 
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assumptions.236 However, the nature of the Cultural Intifada, with not only its 
challenge to Israel, but also its criticism of conservative Palestinian social norms 
and politics, meant that the Freedom Theatre received backlash for its work and 
its perceived betrayal of Palestine. This discourse led to real-world 
consequences as Juliano Mer Khamis was subsequently murdered, purportedly 
assassinated by a Palestinian extremist. Such an outcome demonstrates the 
power and hegemony of the dominant Palestinian narrative, both in terms of its 
dictation of narrative as well as how Palestinian narrators should narrate their 
shared experience. 
The Freedom Bus, with its divergence in aim from Arna’s Children and the 
Cultural Intifada – to now bear witness to the daily life of the Israeli occupation, 
rather than challenging Palestinian society – demonstrates how the Freedom 
Theatre ultimately responded to this punitive response. The change in the 
Theatre’s narrative was an ontological one, from an introspective Palestinian 
counternarrative to an extrospective Israeli counternarrative. There was, 
however, another process going on simultaneously in the wake of Mer Khamis’ 
death, as his legacy was also being interpreted as a foundation to be built-upon, 
rather than a tangible on-going movement; his work would have a lasting 
impact, but the Freedom Theatre could not replace him and would thus decide 
their own path for cultural resistance. This shift also led the Freedom 
Theatre/Bus narrative away from its position as something of a Palestinian 
counternarrative, towards a greater convergence with the dominant Palestinian 
narrative. Additionally, those telling the Freedom Bus’ narrative gradually, but 
inconsistently, adopted mainstream Palestinian paradigms of the Israeli-
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Palestinian Conflict – the Settler-Colonial and Apartheid paradigms. What 
becomes apparent is the influence and significance dominance has in a 
narrative discourse, especially as a self-perpetuating phenomenon that 




Narrating within the Contexts and Confines of the Occupation: The 
Influence of Palestinian Presence and Physicality 
 Exploring narrative discourse, it is easy to become fixated on theoretical 
notions and the exchange of ideas. However, narrators, whether individuals or 
organisations, are not simply voices in a debate, but physical entities existing 
within a real-world context. Palestinian narrators not only argue against the 
Zionist regime in a theoretical or moral sense, but from a position wherein they 
are subject to the realities of the occupation on a daily basis. Just as they argue 
the Palestinian perspective within a theoretical framework dominated by the 
Israeli Conflict paradigm, these narrators present their case from a position 
within the material confines created by Israel. The effect of this physicality is 
twofold, both as a tangible limitation, and a means of interpreting and 
articulating Israeli-Palestinian discourse. In challenging both the dominant 
Israeli argument of a lack of any meaningful Palestinian presence in the land of 
Palestine, and the very real efforts by the Zionist programme to cleanse this 
same land to make way for Israeli settlement, the physicality of the Palestinian 
becomes an important argument in a Palestinian narrative.237 The Palestinian 
people are not simply conceptual and their identity, especially as the Freedom 
Bus presents it, is directly tied to the land of Palestine. Similarly, whilst 
Palestinians are aware of the rationales behind Zionism, their experience of this 
oppressive system is inextricably linked to its physicality, as they face day-to-
day confinement and violence. Particularly for the Freedom Bus’ narrative, the 
result is a visual dichotomy, as the land of Palestine – a beautiful symbol of 
Palestinian identity – occupies the same physical space as the ugly face of the 
Israeli occupation, meaning the imagery it deploys is in conflict with itself. The 
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lands of Israel-Palestine – their materiality, structures and nature – are 
ultimately themselves the sites of conflict, both as a vehicle for understanding 
identity and the context Palestinians live within, and in a literal sense, as 
narrators are required to navigate these spaces in their efforts. As the Freedom 
Bus explicitly seeks to “bear witness,” these physical, visual surroundings play a 
key part in informing their narrative, acting as communicable representations of 
the Zionist programme and Israeli occupation.238 That is not to say the Freedom 
Bus was entirely at the whim of its experiences during its Rides, however, as it 
was also able to draw on its own experience and, to some extent, decide what 
parts of the Israeli occupation it would bear witness to during its travels. The 
physicality of the Freedom Bus means that the narrative it creates is 
unavoidably informed by its real-world surroundings, its choices in planning its 
Rides and its experiences operating within the Israeli occupation. Being granted 
the “permission to narrate” does not only mean being provided or creating a 
space within the discourse to have Palestinian voices heard, but also the 
physical means and capability to create and communicate these ideas. Such a 
notion is crucial in truly understanding how narratives are formed, but often 
overlooked when considering Israeli-Palestinian narrative discourse. 
 
Beauty and the Israeli Beast: Palestinian Purity and the Ugly Occupation 
The Freedom Bus, as a Palestinian narrator, sought overall to challenge 
the Israeli occupation of Palestine and emphasise the right to Palestinian 
freedom and self-determination. More specifically, like Juliano Mer Khamis and 
the Freedom Theatre, it emphasised Palestinian cultural resistance and the 
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freeing of the Palestinian mind in the face of Israel’s destruction of Palestinian 
culture. Fundamentally, much of the Bus’ narrative concerned Palestinian 
introspection, self-expression and visibility. As such, the actions of the Freedom 
Bus and the contents of its output reflected this narrative. As a core part of its 
narrative, the Bus created an image of an archetypal, idealised Palestinian as a 
national character who holds traits that emphasise Palestinians’ undeniable 
presence on their land. Additionally, through imagery, Palestinians are often 
described in relation to the land they occupy, especially in its natural state. In 
contrast to this, the Bus crafted its own portrayal of “the Israeli” as a generalised 
antithetical figure, abstracted from individualised identity and featured almost 
exclusively as a threat to the Freedom Bus and the Palestinians. Such a 
juxtaposition also feeds into their imagery, as they – both textually and 
photographically – present the Israeli occupation as an ugly presence, alien to 
natural Palestinian beauty. The perspective provided by the Freedom Bus 
inextricably ties the Palestinian people to the land of Palestine, and thereby 
equates Israeli oppression of Palestinians and encroachment on Palestinian 
land as one and the same – an offensive, violent act. Overall, the Freedom Bus 
narrative presents itself through an emphasis on Palestinian presence by 
witnessing the (natural) existences of Palestinians and the (unnatural) Israeli 
threats to these existences. 
 Whilst the Freedom Bus calls for and highlights traits such as strength 
and unity as important for Palestinian identity and survival, the core of its 
characterisation of Palestinians lies in its emphasis on presence. Such a notion 
is common in Palestinian narratives, as there is a necessity to challenge the 
Israelis’ insistence that the Palestinians do not exist. As Rashid Khalidi puts it, 
“over seventy years after the creation of Israel, the Palestinian people . . . were 
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no longer supposed to constitute any kind of national presence. In their place 
was meant to stand a Jewish state, uncontested by the indigenous society that 
it was meant to supplant.”239 In this vein, a frequent Palestinian mantra is “to 
exist is to resist” – the idea that the mere act of continued presence in the face 
of Israeli erasure is resistance. The Freedom Bus itself uses the mantra, as the 
phrase forms the title of a blog post from the 27th March 2013 which argues that 
“perhaps the most fundamental form of popular resistance is simply to remain 
on the land . . . hence the famous slogan: ‘To Exist Is To Resist.’”240 Whilst 
showing some commonality with dominant Palestinian ideas and narratives, the 
use of this phrase also highlights the underlying ideas behind the Freedom Bus’ 
presentation of what it means to be Palestinian. There is a certain simplicity in 
what such a phrase asks of a Palestinian, although the reality would be much 
more complex. The same blog post where the Bus features the mantra relates a 
seminar day in which Ride participants learn from two Palestinian academics, 
stating: 
This kind of resistance is key to Palestinian life in Area C, where homes 
and infrastructure are constantly being demolished, and traditional ways 
of life are becoming increasingly difficult. [Professor] Mazin [Qumsiyeh] 
argued that in this way, every Palestinian living in Gaza or the West Bank 
is engaged in resistance every day.241 
Resistance fundamentally becomes about being Palestinian, despite the 
constant and growing challenges. In this regard, Palestinian identity itself 
becomes the foundation of effective resistance; the presence of Palestinians not 
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only corporeally, but culturally – not only remaining on the physical land, but 
also maintaining a sense of self and unity in opposition to Israeli oppression and 
erasure. Along these lines, the Freedom Bus creates, through its narrative, a 
sense of what this Palestinian identity is, emphasising the attributes that lead to 
and must be saved by Palestinian presence and resistance. 
“To exist is to resist” also relates closely to the Palestinian nationalistic concept 
of sumud (صمود), which is typically translated as “steadfastness.” Annecy Lax 
outlines the concept by stating that: 
The term sumud has morphed to span cultural resistance and the 
maintenance of traditions, to economic resilience via micro-enterprises 
and to “ideational resistance (maintaining a sense of hope, endurance, 
and normalcy)” . . . “everyday resistance” – the daily praxis where 
subordinate groups challenge and subvert the power of the oppressor.242 
According to Samih K. Farsoun and Jean M. Landis, sumud has two main 
derivations. Firstly, emerging in the latter 1970s, there was “static sumud,” 
which Palestinian activist Ibrahim Dakkak defined as the “maintenance of 
Palestinians on their land” – again harkening to “to exist is to resist” – 
characterised by a resigned-yet-determined manner.243 This was followed by 
the development of sumud muqawim (صمود المقاوم), or “resistance sumud,” which 
took a more active approach to build alternative institutions, and resist and 
undermine Israeli occupation, in contrast to the passive nature of standard 
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sumud.244 The phrase is effectively an all-encompassing term to describe an 
underlying and continual state of resistance that ranges from large-scale 
resistance to small, individual acts.  It informs and collectivises Palestinian 
resistance, even drawing-in those not involved in “active” resistance but 
continuing to live in Palestine. It provides a baseline of Palestinian identity and 
resistance to aspire to. 
The Freedom Bus makes multiple explicit references to “steadfastness” as a 
definitive Palestinian characteristic. In the blog’s Arabic-language post “The 
Great Walk” (المسير الكبير), the Bus uses the word sumud specifically. Firstly, the 
Bus argues that the Palestinian National Authority (PNA)’s lack of response to 
the village’s need for teachers is an “example of the Authority’s failure to fulfil its 
duties towards the Jordan Valley people to support their presence and 
steadfastness [صمودهم] in the face of Israeli occupation.”245 Secondly, the Bus 
praises a man named Makhoul Khalaf and his family, living in a complex in the 
mountains, as “this complex was demolished three times in one month, but 
[they] insist on their steadfastness [صمودهم] and stayed. They rebuilt it and have 
sworn not to surrender or abandon their land.”246 Both of these instances 
highlight the Freedom Bus’ emphasis on the importance of remaining present 
on Palestinian land as opposition to Israel. Lastly, the post explicitly refers to 
sumud as a nationalistic characteristic in relating the story of a man named Abu 
Saqr, who the Freedom Bus described as “an example of the steadfast 
Palestinian [الفلسطيني الصامد], resisting in his land, remaining on it, familiar with the 
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history of the Palestinian issue and international law, and argues his right to all 
levels of visitors.”247 The Bus’ specific wording of “the steadfast Palestinian” 
presents it as something of an archetype of Palestinian-ness within the national 
identity – not just a resistance concept, but a personal ideal. 
 The Freedom Bus’ description of Palestinian identity, especially with 
archetypes such as “the Steadfast Palestinian,” presents a romanticised view of 
what it means to be Palestinian. This becomes especially apparent as the Bus 
goes beyond relating sumud only as a characteristic of the Palestinian people to 
attribute it to inanimate objects. In a post from the 2016 Ride, the blog relates a 
moment where the Bus requires repairs, stating: 
On the way to Yerza the Freedom Bus got two flat tires. There was only 
one spare and it was clearly Palestinian, as it maintained steadfastness 
through the rocky roads of the mountains until we were able to buy a 
second.248 
Throughout the Freedom Bus narrative, notions of Palestinian identity become 
wrapped-up in the utility of inanimate objects as well as in aesthetic beauty. The 
Bus frequently opined about the beauty of the landscape of Palestine; however, 
these descriptions moved beyond this, also infusing notions of Palestinian 
nationalistic identity into the land itself and its material features (at least those 
not associated with Israel). On day seven of the 2014 Ride, the Bus blog relates 
a guided walk, stating: 
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The walk continues through the typical stunning Palestinian landscape 
that tell so many tales of beauty and suffering without speaking a word. 
Sometimes we get brief explanations, other times we all reflect looking 
out at sandy, stony hills interrupted by pastures of the lushest of green 
you want to dive right in!249 
The description of and imagery applied to the Palestinian landscape not only 
demonstrates the emotion that the Bus’ narrative ascribes to the Palestinian 
experiences, but also gives a sense of the passion of the activists themselves. 
The passion driving the Bus’ narrative demonstrates how this emotional aspect 
takes precedent in leading its imagery, rather than standard aesthetic beauty. In 
the same 2014 blog post, the Bus gives a description of a Bedouin cave: 
After arriving in Mofaqarra we all get to cool off sitting down on 
comfortable mattresses in a Bedouin home – a cave. Makeshift shelves 
are fixed to the ceiling, storage is improvised by means of bags hanging 
off a wall in the most decorative fashion… There are some very beautiful 
vintage clocks, vases and other bric-a-brac – this cave exudes the 
feeling of roots, steadfastness.250 
From the Bus’ textual description, the reader is given a sense of a minimalistic, 
but beautifully-adorned space that embodies Palestinian identity and culture. 
However, photographs accompanying the day on the Bus’ Facebook page show 
the Bedouin cave, with one showing the sundries described in the blog post. 
 
249 The Freedom Bus, ‘Day #7’, Freedom Bus: Ride for Justice (2014) 
<https://freedombuspalestine.wordpress.com/2014/03/24/day-7/> [Accessed 2nd March 2021]. 




(Figure 1: Decorated Bedouin cave)251 
A dissonance becomes apparent between the romanticised description given 
through the Freedom Bus’ narrative and the more-simplistic appearance seen in 
the photography. The sense of Palestinian identity tied-up in the Freedom Bus’ 
narrative enhances the beauty of the imagery it includes. The beauty of the 
cave’s aesthetics stems from the sense of steadfastness it provides; the 
presence of the Bedouins and their collected belongings demonstrate their 
existence and continued presence on this land. It is less in the presentation of 
these objects and more in their presence, and, by extension, the sense of 
longevity they provide. The concepts of Palestinian identity created and 
perpetuated through the Freedom Bus narrative transcend how the Bus sees 
Palestinian people into how it sees the land of Palestine itself and the 
 
251 The Freedom Bus, ‘Day #7 – The Beauty and the Pain of Palestine’, @thefreedombus, 23rd 
March 2014 (Facebook page), 
<https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?vanity=thefreedombus&set=a.631469676901742> 
[Accessed 2nd March 2021]. 
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Palestinian-owned inanimate objects that occupy that land. The beauty of the 
Palestinian people and land is found in the underlying symbols of resistance 
apparent through the Freedom Bus and wider Palestinian narrative. 
In stark contrast to the romanticised description of Palestinian Palestine, 
the Freedom Bus presents the Israeli occupation as an eyesore – not just an 
action-based violation of Palestinian rights, but a visible blight on the land itself. 
In the same post from the seventh day of the 2014 Ride, the Bus sums up this 
notion in a description of the landscape surrounding their walk: “we see Yatta in 
the distance, the landscape is so beautiful yet broken by illegal settlements and 
outposts. There it is: the ugly face of the occupation, land theft, water theft, 
human rights violations…”252 In the same way that Palestine’s natural beauty is 
inextricably linked to the Palestinian national consciousness, the Bus collates 
the tangible structures of the Israeli occupation with the abstract processes of 
Palestinian erasure. The Bus’ Facebook page features photographs from that 
day, which demonstrate how this notion of beautiful Palestinian purity and ugly 
Israeli incursion also informed not only the images the Bus collected, but how 
they were interpreted. One image shows the scene accompanying the blog’s 
description of Yatta. 
 




(Figure 2: Landscape of Yatta)253 
The settlements and outposts the blog describes can be seen in the 
photograph, and the road visible in the lower third is an Israeli one, constructed 
for the illegal settlers.254 However, the image itself is inoffensive; without the 
context provided by the blog, it is not apparent that the structures are Israeli or 
that they are built on Palestinian land; the violence of the occupation is not 
visible. As such, the meaning behind the image is created by the Freedom Bus 
– they ascribed the context of the photograph, and the accompanying emotion 
and outrage. The photograph itself is not designed to insight anger. The image 
is framed “beautifully,” following photographic techniques that are approved of 
as conventionally beautiful. The subject of the photograph is also typically seen 
 
253 The Freedom Bus, ‘Day #7 – The Beauty and the Pain of Palestine’, @thefreedombus, 23rd 
March 2014 (Facebook page), 
<https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?vanity=thefreedombus&set=a.631469676901742> 
[Accessed 2nd March 2021]. 
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as beautiful – a warm, fertile landscape with clear skies. Within this subject, 
there is a visual dissonance. The photo’s purpose is to display the Israeli 
structures, but the intentional, artistic framing and the visually-pleasing contents 
feature equally or even more prominently. Fundamentally, a contradiction also 
presents itself in so far as the Freedom Bus narrative is concerned, as it is 
impossible to capture the Israeli occupation without also capturing the land of 
Palestine. The land featured in the photograph is part of the same “beautiful 
Palestine” that represents Palestinian identity. In this sense, the Bus perhaps 
does not take issue with these buildings as physical entities, but much more so 
with what they represent; the lack of Palestinian agency in deciding which 
building is constructed where and what their purposes are, or that these 
buildings are used to annex Palestinian land. 
In the same way, “the Israeli,” as an actor in the Freedom Bus’ narrative, 
is abstracted. In the image of Yatta, “the Israeli” is not represented by people, 
but by these same buildings that the Bus ascribes negative attributes. In this 
regard, the Israelis are a faceless enemy, with the occupation not present in the 
narrative through the actions of people, but in the results of their efforts – the 
structures they install to displace the Palestinians. The same blog post from 
Day Seven, 2014, shares how “our next local guide talk[ed] about how the army 
forces families to leave their homes, claiming the land as a military firing zone 
and in general doing their best to make live[sic.] unbearable for 
communities.”255 The Facebook photo album provides an accompanying image 
of the concrete block installed to demarcate this zone. 
 




(Figure 3: Israeli military firing zone)256 
In this image, the figure of “the Israeli” is represented not by the soldiers who 
forced the Palestinians off their land, but by the signs on the concrete blocks; 
the Israeli remains a faceless presence and threat. Although this image may 
provide a clearer instance of the systems of the Israeli occupation than the 
image of the countryside, as the sign provides the viewer with some 
information, the context is again provided separately by the Freedom Bus’ blog, 
and the meaning behind the image and the negative connotations are ascribed 
by the Bus’ narrative. Within the image, the only information provided is the text 
– “DANGER, FIRING AREA, ENTRY FORBIDDEN” – and that it is given in 
three languages – Hebrew, Arabic and English – with Hebrew coming first, 
suggesting it is Israeli. The image shows the aftermath of the forced military 
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evictions – although, there is an absence of any explicit Palestinian suffering 
and it can only imply the ongoing harassment such a designation of that land 
would mean. There are buildings visible in the distance, but it is unclear what 
they are (although they are assumedly Israeli, from contextual knowledge). The 
framing of the image presents the faceless Israeli mandate as an overbearing 
presence, with the rest of the photo empty or sparse. In the same way that “the 
Israeli” is abstracted from any human presence in these images, the threat of 
the Israeli occupation is also abstracted as there is no inclusion of explicit 
suffering or clear danger within the mise-en-scène. The Palestinians 
themselves are absent. Even the textual description provided in the blog, 
outlining the purpose of demarcating the land a military firing zone, does not 
detail the actions taken by the Israelis to achieve this goal, leaving the threat 
non-specific and to the imagination of the narrative’s recipient. 
Such a presence and threat can be seen in less abstracted, more 
aggressive examples of materiality, however, such as with militarised constructs 
like barbed wire, fences or, more-recognisably, the separation wall. These 
photographs provide more-widely recognised images of violence and power that 
the Freedom Bus narrative’s audience would be familiar with regardless of their 
background. These images also emphasise the visual juxtaposition between the 
more-natural, architectural or simpler Palestinian structures, and the harsh, 
aggressive, utilitarian Israeli structures. Where the Palestinian structures fit 
visually with their surroundings, or appear naturalised, the Israeli structures 
appear alien or unnatural. A post from Day Nine of the 2016 Ride features an 




(Figure 4: Israel military checkpoint in Hebron)257 
This instance is one of the more overt examples, as the structure is a relatively 
large one; however, the juxtaposition with the historic architecture is clear. Such 
uses of heritage see the conceptualisation of “contact zones,” which represent 
spaces for dialogue, negotiation and conflict between competing narratives, 
 
257 The Freedom Bus, ‘Day 9 – Checkpoints and child arrests’, Freedom Bus: Ride for Justice 
(2016) <https://freedombuspalestine.wordpress.com/2016/03/30/day-9-checkpoints-and-child-
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especially in contexts that see asymmetrical power dynamics.258 The purpose of 
such juxtapositions is then to emphasise the long-standing Palestinian presence 
over the newer, unwelcoming, aggressive Israeli claim to that presence; to 
emphasise the necessity of material power in maintaining the Israeli occupation 
and narrative. 
Images of active tools of repression – rather than passive tools such as military 
zone demarcations – also give the viewer more of a sense of the active role of 
people and violence of the occupation. However, still images cannot capture 
these actions unless they are present within the frame, and so the meaning 
behind the image is again reliant on the Freedom Bus’ accompanying narrative. 
In the post, the Freedom Bus describes the situation in Hebron to accompany 
the image of the checkpoint: 
The beauty of this ancient city, with its old buildings and winding streets, 
is totally overshadowed by the lethal military presence. Menacing 
soldiers with guns patrol the city and cage-like checkpoints with turnstiles 
and body scanners are always just around the corner. The city is 
shrouded in tension.259 
With the framing of the image, the overshadowing military presence is clear, 
however the lethality of this presence and the tension is only implied. Although, 
the viewer may also recognise the unusuality of such a military presence in a 
civilian population centre, at least in the Western world. Such an image is much 
 
258 Feras Hammami, ‘Issues of Mutuality and Sharing in the Transnational Spaces of Heritage: 
Contesting Diaspora and Homeland Experiences in Palestine’, International Journal of Heritage 
Studies, 22.6 (2016), 446-465, p.452. 
259 The Freedom Theatre, ‘Day 9 – Checkpoints and child arrests’ (2016). 
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more typical within a colonial context, however, and one that would be 
especially recognised by the oppressed. As Frantz Fanon writes: 
The colonial world is a world cut in two. The dividing line, the frontiers are 
shown by barracks and police stations. In the colonies it is the policeman 
and the soldier who are the official, instituted go-betweens, the 
spokesperson of the settler and his rule of oppression. . . . The 
policeman and the soldier, by their immediate presence and their 
frequent and direct action maintain contact with the native and advise 
him by means of rifle-butts and napalm not to budge. It is obvious here 
that the agents of the government speak the language of pure force. The 
intermediary does not lighten the oppression, nor seek to hide the 
domination; he shows them up and puts them into practice with the clear 
conscience of an upholder of the peace; yet he is the bringer of violence 
into the home and into the mind of the native.260 
In this regard, the purpose of the military presence is not intended to be 
recognised by those outside of the context, and this presence is indeed 
presented by the occupier as an upholding of the peace; the Israeli narrative – 
the narrative accepted by those in power in the West – would have these 
military structures be a necessary precaution against Palestinian violence. The 
true message of these structures, however, is clear to the occupied Palestinian, 
as Israel’s purpose is to dissuade the oppressed from resisting their occupation. 
It is this inherent understanding that the photograph cannot capture on its own, 
as the occupier-occupied messaging is not inherently understood by those with 
an outsider’s perspective. Whilst the photograph is the same for all, the 
 
260 Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, p.29. 
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interpretation is dependent on perspective, and thus the Freedom Bus’ textual 
context is necessary. Ultimately, even with a recognition of the military and 
violent applications of these material objects, the meaning behind these 
presences is still abstracted and open to interpretation, requiring the Freedom 
Bus narrative to provide this meaning. At the same time, it is this materiality that 
leads this narrative, as the Bus inherently seeks to respond to these material 
presences. As such, in the imagery the Freedom Bus uses to present its 
narrative, the “ugly face of the occupation” is largely comprised of the visible 
scars left by Israeli policies and incursions on Palestinian land, rather than of 
current acts of violence perpetrated by the Israelis, or of the Israeli people in the 
West Bank themselves. At the same time, however, with the Israeli occupation 
being a gradual process of displacement, rather than a rapid, highly-visible 
removal, such images perhaps best-represent what “the Israeli” is to the 
Palestinians living in the West Bank. 
 That being said, there are images and representations of Israel that do 
capture in-progress acts of violence and the Israeli people that perpetrate these. 
These images, however, are only derived from the direct experiences of the 
Freedom Bus during its Rides. In travelling within the confines of the Israeli 
occupation, and engaging in activism and supporting the communities Zionism 
seeks to erase, the Bus and the Palestinians it visits are confronted by Israeli 
soldiers and, to a lesser extent, settlers. The nature of these interactions inform 
the Freedom Bus’ narrative presentation of “the Israeli” as, even when 
interacting with these Israeli people, the Bus’ focus is rather on the present 
violence, with the Israeli as a soldier, rather than an individual. Such 
interactions often take place in its stops in Nabi Saleh, for instance, where there 
are anticipated weekly demonstrations. During the Freedom Bus’ involvement 
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with the Nabi Saleh demonstration from Day Five, 2016, the Bus photographed 
an Israeli soldier. 
 
(Figure 5: Israeli soldier firing teargas)261 
The photograph shows an Israeli soldier firing teargas under the direction of 
another soldier. With this image, the Freedom Bus is giving a human face to 
 
261 The Freedom Bus, ‘Day 5 – Struggle and Solidarity: the Friday Demonstration in Nabi Saleh’, 
Freedom Bus: Ride for Justice (2016) 
<https://freedombuspalestine.wordpress.com/2016/03/26/day-5-struggle-and-solidarity-the-
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“the Israeli” of the occupation as the viewer sees a person, rather than only the 
material outputs of the occupation they see otherwise – the distant settlements, 
and signs and demarcations. The purpose of the image is not to capture the 
soldier himself, however, but his military equipment, or rather his overall role 
and appearance as a soldier. The blog post accompanies this image by writing: 
Within minutes, the soldiers began to throw canisters onto the road that 
exploded with a loud noise. This startled the crowd and we split, running 
in different directions. Shortly after, several tear gas canisters were 
thrown. The sound bombs and tear gas are “crowd dispersal” tactics. 
Tear gas overwhelms your senses: your throat is raw, you struggle to 
breathe and your eyes sting so much you can barely keep them open.262 
The post focusses specifically on the soldiers’ deployment of teargas; the 
weapons of the occupation, rather than the Israeli employing these weapons. 
Whilst this image, unlike the previous examples, does feature an in-progress act 
of violence perpetrated visibly by an Israeli, the context the Bus provides is still 
concerned with the inanimate objects of the occupation; there is still a distance 
between the Palestinians and any Israeli human presence. It does not matter 
who the person is, just that they are carrying the tools of the occupier. In this 
vein, the soldier himself – despite being a sentient, individual person – is rather 
a continuation of the Freedom Bus narrative’s presentation of “the Israeli” 
through materiality, as the focus is on the physicality of these soldiers. The 
Israeli soldier is not a person, but rather a collection of military equipment and 
weapons, and “the soldier” as a non-individual character. Furthermore, the 
soldier and their weapons, as a material object, fit with the images of Israeli 
 
262 The Freedom Bus, ‘Day 5 – Struggle and Solidarity’ (2016). 
104 
 
structures and demarcations as examples of gradual displacement, as the 
purpose of their presence is not to defeat the Palestinians outright, but to 
frustrate them and wear them down, and keep them subdued as annexation 
continues. In all of these instances, the soldier is a tool of the occupation akin to 
the signs and structures put in place as part of a system of repression. 
The Israeli soldiers’ presence as a material object of the occupation – a 
collection of tools of repression – is more striking when the Freedom Bus 
juxtaposes these soldiers with the Palestinian people. Such instances highlight 
the rationale behind this perspective in the Bus’ narrative as well as the purpose 
in presenting this contrast. From the Bus’ perspective, “the Israeli” represents a 
physical, militaristic response to its mental, cultural resistance – although it does 
carry out physical demonstrations of this. This contrast is then presented in its 
narrative outputs to highlight this physical crackdown on mental resistance. In 
the same post from Day Five of the 2016 Ride, the blog features an image of a 
Palestinian woman standing in front of the Israeli military; from the text, it is 
apparent that this image was taken just after the soldiers arrived, before they 




(Figure 6: Palestinian protester in front of Israeli military)263 
The Palestinian woman is a civilian, exhibiting a Palestinian flag and hand 
gestures symbolising peace, confronted with military personnel, weapons and 
an armoured military police vehicle. The purpose of the image is to emphasise 
the peacefulness of the Palestinian whilst also contrasting this with the violence 
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of the Israeli – the asymmetry of force. The framing of the image, in and of itself, 
however, also provides an insight into the Israelis’ posture in their confrontation 
of Palestinians. Unlike the previous image of the soldier firing teargas, this 
image shows the Israeli soldier behaving in a nonchalant manner, their guns 
lowered, helmet visor raised. There is no sense of immediate threat to the 
Palestinians. There is no violence in the image itself, only the symbols of 
violence – the military equipment; again, the material signifiers of the 
occupation. There is equally no sense that the soldiers expect a threat to 
themselves and that their presence in this sort of scenario is routine; they know 
what to expect and what their actions will be. Whilst the Freedom Theatre 
canon acknowledges that violent Palestinian resistance exists, especially in 
Arna’s Children, such a presentation of peaceful Palestine versus violent Israel 
is much more in-keeping with the Freedom Theatre/Bus narrative of cultural 
resistance. The act of featuring these images on the Bus’ blog perpetuates this 
form of resistance, as it feeds into the narrative of Palestinian national identity, 
and the dynamic between Palestine and Israel presented by the dominant 
Palestinian narrative and the narrative of the Freedom Theatre/Bus. Such 
photographs also reveal the intentionality behind the images the Freedom Bus 
captures for its narrative; it is not only in-progress acts of occupation or violence 
that the Bus captures in the moment, but also opportunities it seeks for images 
that feed into the cultural narrative it presents. The activists combined both the 
physicality of the Palestinian – the nationalistic and peaceful iconography – and 
the Israeli – the tools of violence and occupation – in order to create meaning. 
The posturing of the image with the Palestinian woman and the Israeli military 
police suggests that the composition was either a product of the woman’s 
choice to make a statement, or a scenario created by the Bus for the 
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photograph itself. In either case, the Freedom Bus sought the juxtaposed 
framing of the peaceful Palestinian and the militarised Israeli in line with its 
narrative and core messaging. 
 
Physical Limitations from Within and Without 
 Alongside the influence of physicality in informing the Freedom Bus’ 
perspective, the Bus’ physical presence within Israel-Palestine impacts its 
narrative by imposing limitations on the scope of its activism and its ability to 
carry out that activism. The Bus took a somewhat microcosmic focus, with its 
perspective informed by its tour structure and the specific locations it visited, as 
well as its locality within the West Bank specifically. Whilst the Bus chose where 
to visit, such decisions would have been influenced to some extent by its 
existing narrative, and where it chose to visit would then, in turn, develop this 
narrative, as these experiences would inform the Bus’ perspective. Operating in 
a heavily-controlled area, subject to Israeli land fragmentation and restrictions 
on movement, would also impact where the Bus could travel, thus also 
influencing what it could witness and, by extension, its narrative. These factors 
would ultimately editorialise the Freedom Bus’ narrative, as these journeys and 
experiences decided the content of the Bus’ output. These tangible limitations 
present a side of Palestinian narration not captured by a focus on historical or 
political discourse – one representative of the obstacles put in place by Israel 
physically and militarily, rather than just through its narrative hegemony. 
Ultimately, and especially as the Freedom Bus’ intention is to “bear 
witness,” the narrative the Bus presents is heavily informed by the physical or 
tangible signifiers that are presented to them through the course of their 
108 
 
activism. The significance of this materiality is heightened by the nature of the 
Freedom Bus Rides themselves. As the Bus takes a specific route that makes 
specific stops, and those riding with the Bus carry out preordained and locality-
specific activities, these same people who go on to create and present the Bus’ 
narrative online do so with a very particular thread of information. The Freedom 
Bus conducted itself through annual “Rides” around the West Bank across nine 
to thirteen days. During the Rides, the Bus would travel between Palestinian 
communities within the West Bank, carrying out various activities – holding 
workshops and putting on playback theatre performances, for example, but also 
working with the local community to improve their bespoke situation through 
construction and other means. Such projects could be incredibly localised and 
specific, such as when the Bus helped a village called Khirbit Samra build a 
school with mud bricks during its 2013 Ride.264 More widely, however, the 
Freedom Bus would focus on greater issues, such as water access. In late 
2012, for example, the Freedom Bus held a “Ride for Water Justice” in addition 
to its Freedom Ride for that year.265 
Even within its more-general annual Rides, the Freedom Bus, especially earlier 
on, took a practical focus on the problems facing Palestinians; such an 
approach perhaps informed by the Bus’ goal to “bear witness,” as it would 
inherently see the tangible, material effects of the Israeli occupation. The 
Freedom Bus’ first post from its first Ride in 2012, for instance, focusses entirely 
on the issue of water access facing the village of Faquaa.266 Even the Bus’ 
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description of the issue is practically-focussed, relaying the factual aspects and 
the statistics: 
Although the town’s name means spring water bubbles, it has been a 
long time since the villagers had easy access to clean water. Since Israel 
erected the separation barrier, the inhabitants of Faquaa have been cut 
off from their land and can no longer use their traditional underground 
springs. 
Although the village is allocated 300,000 litres of water per day by the 
Israeli Civil Administration, the only filling station is 6km away from the 
village, and the water, once divided evenly between the villagers, leaves 
only 75 litres a day per person. This is well below the 100 litre minimum 
put forward by the World Health Organization. 
To access the water the villagers have to pay to hire tankers to collect 
the water from the filling station and ship it back to the village. This option 
remains unaffordable for many, who instead choose to collect rain water 
in tarps or large containers. This water is often difficult to sterilize, 
leading to an increase in illness.267 
The blogpost is concerned, first and foremost, with informing the reader about 
the water access system implemented by Israel as part of its occupation and 
the effect this has on Palestinians. The post also features two of the stories the 
Bus collected during its playback theatre performance in Faquaa. The first 
concerned “an older woman” and “how her family’s well water became polluted 
with sewage. The family tried everything to clean it, adding chlorine and other 
chemicals, but nothing worked. In the end they had to replace all the water in 
 
267 The Freedom Bus, ‘Day One: Stand with Faquaa!’ (2012). 
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the well. She added that lack of access to water was so difficult because it is 
used for everything; cooking, bathing the children, cleaning the house, washing 
clothes etc.”268 The second was about a young man’s grandmother, who, 
fourteen year prior, had been attacked by Israeli settlers whilst collecting water, 
which the Bus included to highlight that “the problem of water access in Faquaa 
is not a new one, but is part of a long struggle that goes back generations.”269 
Both of these stories highlight the Freedom Bus’ emphasis on practical issues, 
as they demonstrate that the Bus employs the testimonies it collects in order to 
further these same arguments; these particular stories were included in the Bus’ 
output because they fit with their narrative. Further to this, the blogpost prefaces 
these stories by stating that the Bus invited the people of Faquaa to “share their 
real-life stories of water shortage and then transform[ed] them into short pieces 
of theatre,” demonstrating that it was not simply an editorial decision after-the-
fact, but a message the Bus was aware of prior to the Ride and one that they 
sought to “bear witness” to specifically.270 Such issues are not specific to the 
village of Faquaa alone, however. The Bus, for instance, in its 2012 Ride also 
stops in At-Tuwani on its eighth day, and recognises that the village has 
“struggled to gain access to water, while the surrounding settlements are 
supplied by Israeli water system.”271 It is through these shared physical 
signifiers that the Freedom Bus begins to “bear witness” to issues facing the 
Palestinian people on a larger scale. The Freedom Bus was informed by its 
prior awareness of water as a material signifier of the Israeli occupation, and 
this impacted the scope and focus of its narrative. 
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Water access is an issue especially particular to the West Bank, rather 
than an issue faced by Palestinians as a whole, as the Israelis employ policies 
to intentionally restrict Palestinian access and support the growth of Israeli 
settlements. As such, the Freedom Bus was additionally materially informed by 
its overall operation within the West Bank, as a specific Palestinian context. A 
key issue facing Palestinian national identity is that the Palestinian peoples 
were and are fragmented. According to Pappé, “first came the distancing of the 
refugees outside Palestine’s borders and the isolation of the Palestinian 
population in the 1948 territories. Today we also witness the political separation 
between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.”272 This also does not include the 
Palestinian diaspora and those living within sovereign Israel. Despite 
commonality and unity in overall identity and narrative, the desires and needs of 
each group of Palestinians inevitably differs – Pappé argues that “it is very 
difficult [for activists] to adopt a clear ethical position that respects the interests 
of all the Palestinian groups concerned.”273 
As such, with the Freedom Bus geographically confined to the West Bank, the 
issues it would “bear witness” to were inherently tied to the bespoke situation 
under this system of the Israeli occupation. Alongside the division of the West 
Bank into zones of control – with Palestinian Zones A and B, and Israeli Zone C 
– Israel imposed movement restrictions upon the Palestinians, solidifying the 
segregation of Palestinian population centres within the West Bank, and 
between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.274 According to Alison P. Brown, 
“Internal closure is used to control movement . . . and to prevent entry to and 
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exit from villages, cities and refugee camps, by use of roadblocks and 
checkpoints,” as well as roads solely for the use of Israeli settlers.275 As a result, 
Maryam S. Griffin states that the Freedom Bus “aimed to expose its 
international and Palestinian riders to the particularities of life in smaller West 
Bank towns, particularly those rural villages located in Area C.”276 Such 
particularities would not be fully shared with other Palestinian groups (or indeed 
with all West Bank Palestinians, as they fall under differing Israeli “Area” 
designations). In this regard, the Freedom Bus narrative is informed by the 
material signifiers that define the Palestinian experience in the West Bank 
specifically, rather than signifiers that might represent the entirety of the 
Palestinian experience. 
 Further to this, it becomes apparent that these signifiers are also decided 
externally to some extent, as the Israeli occupation of the West Bank informs 
the parameters within which the Freedom Bus acts. The Israeli restriction of 
movement, as one of the most pertinent and invasive elements of the 
occupation, demands the attention of those subjected to it. As such, the 
material presence of this informs the Palestinian and Freedom Bus’ narratives; 
the Bus cannot help but “bear witness” to it. As Griffin argues: 
Palestinian life under occupation has increasingly come to be defined by 
a crisis of contiguity, both territorial and social. As walls, fences, barriers, 
checkpoints and other impediments disrupt the flow of traffic in the 
Occupied Territories, desires for freedom of movement congeal in 
popular demands.277 
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Because of this, and a Palestinian reliance on public transport as a result, the 
bus, as a vehicle, has become a sight of struggle and resistance.278 In 2011, 
prior to the creation of the Freedom Bus, Palestinian activists boarded Jewish-
only buses to protest segregation and the systematic support of illegal Israeli 
settlements.279 The Freedom Bus programme was then created very much with 
the Israeli restrictions on movement in mind, and the Bus chose their vehicle 
consciously, as the goal of the Bus, according to one of its organisers, was to 
build international awareness and rebuild connections amongst West Bank 
Palestinians to resist the social impact of cantonisation.280 Like West Bank 
Palestinians, the Bus is unable to travel through particular areas at different 
times and at the whim of the Israelis, and thus carries out its Rides within the 
confines of the Israeli occupation. As B’Tselem reports: 
Two major checkpoints split the West Bank in three: The Za’atara 
checkpoint between Nablus and Ramallah, which is staffed some of the 
time, and the Container checkpoint east of Abu Dis, which is always 
staffed. The traffic arteries, together with other checkpoints and 
roadblocks, direct all Palestinian traffic moving between the north and 
south of the West Bank into the roads that are controlled by these two 
checkpoints. The military has also installed iron gates at the entrances to 
the vast majority of West Bank villages, allowing it to isolate them within 
minutes and with minimal personnel.281 
The Israeli restriction on movement is characterised by its uncertainty, and so 
the Bus cannot guarantee it will be able to progress unmolested, at any stage. 
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Ahead of its 2013 Ride, for instance, the Freedom Bus was confronted by Israeli 
restrictions on movement, as some of its activists were denied permits to enter 
the West Bank. In a press release, the Bus wrote that: 
The Freedom Theatre was required to submit permit applications to the 
Palestinian Ministry of Civil Affairs. On March 11, after months of waiting, 
The Freedom Theatre finally received notice that these applications had 
been denied by the Israeli Civil Administration. Events such as this serve 
as yet another stark reminder about the humiliating system under which 
we live: That our own Palestinian Ministries must coordinate with, and 
obey Israel.282 
These instances are also a reminder that the Bus, whilst acting as an activist 
and advocate, is itself a Palestinian entity and thus liable to Israeli targeting. 
More typically, the Bus was stopped and confronted by the Israeli army during 
its activities and journeys. These notions of the restriction of Palestinian access 
also go some way to explaining the largely-faceless characterisation of Israelis, 
as the occupation is designed to keep Palestinians away, and so the image of 
“the Israeli” is created by these blockades. The only time such distance is 
broken is when the Bus and the Palestinians it visits are confronted by Israeli 
soldiers. Overall, the Israeli occupation influences the Freedom Bus’ narrative 
through two aspects of its materiality. Firstly, it controls the physical movement 
of the Bus, deciding what the Bus and its members can and cannot see. 
Secondly, it presents an unignorable challenge to Palestinian life that cannot 
help but be an integral part of the Bus’ narrative, as it ultimately seeks to share 
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the plight of the Palestinian people; in this sense, the Freedom Bus’ narrative is 
reactive to the Israeli occupation and thus led by it. 
 
Conclusion 
 Ultimately, notions of physicality permeated all aspects of the formation 
and presentation of the Freedom Bus’ narrative. The Bus was fundamentally 
engaged in the act of “bearing witness” and so it derived meaning from its 
surroundings. The Zionist programme, not just an occupation of the mind, left 
material scars and open wounds on the land of Palestine. The physical contexts 
the Bus operated within acted as both a tool and a hinderance in the formation 
and telling of its narrative. Palestinian identity and the Freedom Bus’ perception 
of this tied into the land itself, not just as a space to occupy, but as a part of 
what it means to be Palestinian. Palestinians were equated with the beauty of 
the land, and the land became beautiful because it was Palestinian – a symbol 
of continued existence, resistance and steadfastness. This notion of the 
physical beauty of Palestine carried into the Freedom Bus’ narrative and 
imagery regardless of its subjective aesthetic quality. Any Palestinian presence 
and materiality on Palestinian land was natural and represented historical 
longevity. By contrast, because of this inextricable link between land and 
identity, the Israeli occupation and its physical features were alien and ugly. 
Where Palestinians and their materiality fit with their surroundings, Israeli 
presences, regardless of the extent of their visual imposition, contrasted 
sharply. The presence of Israeli settlements in the distance were as visually 
offensive as an immediate military presence. Israeli presences in the Freedom 
Bus’ narrative were undivorceable from the inherent and explicit violence of the 
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Israeli occupation, leading the image of “the Israeli” to be fixated primarily on 
the material structures and tools that maintained the occupation. The Freedom 
Bus’ physicality, both concerned with and caught within the confines of this 
occupation, fed into the narrative it presented, and its conceptions of Palestinian 
and Israeli identity. It captured the experiences of the Palestinians physically 
around it – informed by the bespoke, localised issues it was confronted with – 
whilst also being Palestinian itself, subject to the same struggles. The material 
impact of the occupation was both witnessed and felt, and the Freedom Bus 
used its familiarity with the occupation to navigate that physical context and 
witness the issues it knew to be significant. The real-world context the Freedom 
Bus existed within simultaneously limited its scope and access physically, and 
allowed it to use its knowledge and experience to effectively employ that 
materiality to further its narrative. Even whilst Israeli-Palestinian discourse is 
focussed on arguments over the lands of Israel-Palestine themselves, the 
physical significance of these lands is overlooked, with the debate left 
abstracted. They exist not just as a resource to be coveted, but a lived 
experience, a contested space to be navigated and, ultimately, a home. Being 
“Palestinian” requires a physical presence, which acts both as a source of 
inspiration and a limitation to overcome. Narration, in this sense, is not only a 
theoretical concept, but a physical act, demanding of those who seek to be 




Narration as an Impetus for Palestinian Activism 
 The idea that Palestinians need to narrate their own history is founded on 
the notion that they need to do so in order to combat the Israel narrative – it is 
narration with a purpose. As highlighted in the previous chapter, however, there 
is also a practical side to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and, thus, a need to 
take real action alongside this narration. The Freedom Bus, whilst certainly a 
Palestinian narrator, is fundamentally an activist group. The output of their 
narrative is not the central purpose of the Bus, but is rather a means of 
furthering their activist efforts to “bear witness, raise awareness and build 
alliances throughout occupied Palestine and beyond.”283 It is pertinent to ask, 
then, how narration fits into these goals – who is the Freedom Bus’ narration 
and activism serving, primarily? Whilst the Bus’ practical action – the playback 
theatre performances and local projects – were targeted at supporting the local 
Palestinian communities it visited, the presentation of these efforts online was 
aimed at a separate, international audience. Alongside this, the Bus invited 
international attendees to partake in the programme. Effectively, the Freedom 
Bus had three audiences, reached through different mediums, coming from 
different contexts and having different requirements of its activism. By 
extension, narration, as a tool for furthering activism, held different significances 
and purposes for each audience. Equally, the Freedom Bus works within a 
wider trend and network of Palestinian activism, with its efforts serving a 
broader, overall purpose in dismantling the Israeli occupation. The scope of this 
broader activism carries a certain baggage that has particular expectations and 
makes particular demands of those working within it, requiring the Bus to 
 
283 The Freedom Theatre, ‘Freedom Bus’, The Freedom Theatre (2021) 




consider how its activism fits with and contributes to the wider movement, and 
what that activism should look like. Understanding the purposes and 
significances of narration/activism for each of the Freedom Bus’ audiences, and 
how its efforts contributed to the broader movement, helps shed light on the 
relevancy of narration in the twenty-first century Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and 
for contemporary Palestinian activism. This is significant as, whilst narration 
held a clear meaning in terms of arguing the Palestinian case to the 
international community, the changing nature of the Conflict now gives narration 
a different purpose that needs to be explored. 
 
Activism, Audience and Narrative 
The Freedom Bus, in its localised, practical action, sees itself first-and-
foremost serving the Palestinian communities it visits; it is these communities 
for whom the Bus is bearing witness and raising awareness. A significant and 
central part of the Freedom Bus’ story-telling activism is in its use of playback 
theatre to provide a platform for Palestinian individuals to share their 
testimonies. In the Freedom Bus’ own words: 
Palestinian actors and musicians invite true stories from communities 
across Palestine and subsequently transform each account into a piece 
of improvised theatre. This approach, known as Playback Theatre, has 
proved to be a powerful artistic vehicle for witness, solidarity and 
advocacy on a grassroots level.284 
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In academic articles, Ben Rivers has explicitly described playback theatre as an 
interactive process that emphasises histories, and fortifies people in their 
struggles against violence and inequality by helping “provoke critical 
consciousness and the will for action amongst audience members – be they 
international or other Palestinians.”285 In another article, Rivers provides three 
motivations for audience members to share their stories: 
• To share the psychological burden of traumatic events, with the belief 
that understanding, acknowledgement and accompaniment will lead 
to the reduction of psychological suffering. 
• To provide an international audience with insight into the realities of 
life and struggle under occupation, in the hope that a more visceral 
understanding will motivate committed action in solidarity with the 
Palestinian cause. 
• To remind fellow Palestinians about the oppressions and sacrifices 
that have been endured in the struggle for freedom, with the hope 
that this reminder will challenge complacency and stimulate active 
struggle.286 
The first and third bullet points are explicitly concerned with the Palestinians 
who partake in the Bus’ activism. The purpose of its practical action becomes to 
create support networks, in a therapeutic sense, and to channel this solidarity 
and communal experience of oppression into active Palestinian resistance. The 
second bullet point, along these lines, serves to support the resistance 
generated by the third. The Freedom Bus’ activism, from these accounts, is 
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presented as a means for supporting those involved in its theatrical process; its 
action is focussed on the grassroots of Palestinian resistance, helping 
Palestinian communities make sense of their collective experiences under the 
Israeli occupation. 
Through sharing these experiences in a way accessible to the rest of the 
community and the wider world, the Freedom Bus is contributing these stories 
to a collective consciousness. Such a phenomenon has been recognised in 
wider historical contexts. Fanon, for instance, uses an example that: 
Two men are beaten up at Salisbury, and at once the whole of a bloc 
goes into action, talks about those two men, and uses the beating-up 
incident to bring up the particular problem of Rhodesia, linking it, 
moreover, with the whole African question and with the whole question of 
colonised people. . . . [The colonised people] no longer limit themselves 
to regional horizons, for they have caught on to the fact that they live in 
an atmosphere of international stress.287 
Individual stories are shared and compared, and drawn together – recognised 
as wider patterns of oppression, rather than isolated instances; a wider 
narrative begins to be constructed. In this regard, the Freedom Bus’ use of 
playback theatre testimonies provides a springboard for discourse on the Israeli 
occupation as a whole – it bears witness, raises awareness and builds 
solidarity. The purpose, however, is not necessarily in producing this narrative, 
but emphasising and communicating to those being oppressed that they are not 
alone in these experiences. The Bus provides a means of storytelling for the 
subaltern, allowing for the production of “truth” through a performance of 
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collective experience, which also then inherently stands in contrast to the Israeli 
narrative as a result.288 To that end, the Freedom Bus provides volume for the 
Palestinians’ voices, acting as an equaliser against Israeli homogeneity and 
dominance by firstly hearing the stories in a formal setting itself and secondly 
providing a platform wherein they could be heard more-widely, as per Rivers’ 
second bullet-pointed motivation.289 Sharing these testimonies internationally 
gives the sense that they can become part of a greater movement to educate 
and bring about change. The Freedom Bus and its use of playback theatre 
provides the Palestinian peoples a platform through which they can collect, 
organise and legitimate their experiences, as isolated, individual testimonies are 
formalised and given greater authority.290 Ultimately, the Freedom Bus’ methods 
are less concerned with creating a narrative to counter Israel, but rather with 
emphasising commonality and solidarity, and supporting the local Palestinian 
communities it visits. Whilst a narrative becomes necessary to demonstrate and 
contextualise a pattern of Israeli oppression, this narrative is fundamentally only 
formed to further the Freedom Bus’ activism and support for the Palestinians of 
the West Bank. Whilst narration is still relevant, it is not the crux of the 
Palestinian cause. 
 The Freedom Bus’ effort to share these Palestinian experiences online 
also serves the international audience for this platform, however. The online 
platforms are not simply repositories for the Palestinian playback testimonies 
and the Bus employs these testimonies in a particular, intentional way for the 
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narrative it presents, as a means to build-upon and help illustrate the points it is 
otherwise making.291 With creative control of its online platforms, the Bus was 
responsible for how these testimonies are shared, and it interpreted the 
testimonies within the context of its own activism and drew out the anecdotal 
symbolic significances from the literal stories. Rivers recognises himself that 
“care must be taken to ensure that oppressive dynamics are not reproduced 
within the social realm of the theatrical space itself. Cultural activism will remain 
limited for as long as the artistic means of production remain solely within the 
control of ‘expert’ practitioners.”292 Whilst this was stated in relation to 
participation in the playback performances of individuals’ testimonies, such an 
issue persists in the presentation of these testimonies after-the-fact. The online 
dissemination of the playback theatre testimonies effectively becomes part of 
the theatrical performance, as the boundary is blurred between the physical 
local and virtual global audience.293 Emily Bridger, writing on the South African 
Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM), argues that “a chain of abstraction is evident 
in which activists’ own narratives were incrementally rewritten according to the 
audience in question”.294 For the Freedom Bus, the original testimony shared 
during a performance was immediately interpreted and retold by the actors with 
its physical audience in mind. After an individual’s story has been performed, 
the activists ask “did you see your story?” to confirm their satisfaction with the 
portrayal, as though to alleviate any concerns about shared authority.295 
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However, in a theatre with a live audience and an authoritative acting group, it is 
not unreasonable to suggest that an individual is unlikely to interrupt or upset 
the proceedings by voicing dissatisfaction. Furthermore, the main point of 
concern for the individual would likely be the accuracy of the sequence of 
events, rather than of the nuances of the testimony. 
The next link in the “chain of abstraction” is then in the Bus’ distribution of these 
performed testimonies online, as the activist group had to curate its experiences 
to share those which it felt to be best-representative of its efforts and message. 
The purpose of the Freedom Bus’ activism shifts, with narrative becoming more 
significant as the scope of its audience widens; the testimonies the Bus collects 
become a tool for enabling this. For instance, a post to the Freedom Bus blog 
on the 29th September 2012 relates the narratives of Bedouins affected by 
Israeli occupation: 
The Bedouin are frequent victims of violence at the hands of settlers. We 
heard a story from an older man called Ahmed about the death of his 
brother, who was hit by a settler’s car while on the way to school and 
killed. There was an investigation into the death but no one was ever 
brought to justice. “I am afraid of sending my children to a faraway school 
now,” he said, “we need our own school here.” It is clear that the loss of 
Khan al-Ahmar’s school would affect the community deeply. 
We heard stories of shepherds who have been arrested for grazing 
sheep too close to the settlements, and whose flocks have been 
confiscated. We heard from a young Bedouin man about his arrest, 




While settlers can build homes anywhere, these people are prevented 
from pursuing their traditional way of life, and their homes are constantly 
under threat. Nonetheless, an older Bedouin man described the Bedouin 
as “fierce and resilient people” who will resist as long as they can. As one 
young Bedouin man put it, “the singer may die, but the song will live.”296 
The testimonies are included in an illustrative capacity, almost as witness-
testimonial evidence of Israeli violations. Details on the individuals and their 
testimonies are minimal and the focusses are on the violent or oppressive acts 
carried out by the Israelis. In this regard, the Freedom Bus is not dissimilar to 
other activist groups who act with a particular message and focus, whether 
intentionally or unintentionally. For the AAM, the stories the anti-Apartheid 
activists collected and shared were transformed at each level to meet the 
criteria for those sharing them. As far as South African child activists were 
concerned, their narratives emphasised their individual stalwartness and 
commitment to overcoming Apartheid; however, the AAM, in sharing these 
narratives, generalised the stories and emphasised human rights issues and 
child victimisation.297 Unlike with the AAM, the Bedouins here are not presented 
merely as victims, as they are shown to still be resistant. However, the way in 
which the Freedom Bus included this still primarily serves their own narrative, 
as the quotes appear to be included more because they offer appealing 
soundbites, rather than because it helps adhere to the individuals’ narratives. 
The individual Palestinians are listened to and repeated selectively through a 
goal-led activist perspective, wherein the message of the testimony is more 
important than the testimony itself. Although the Freedom Bus provides a 
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platform for Palestinians to share their testimonies, emphasising the support 
this provides, the way in which these are then transposed onto its online outputs 
incorporates them into the narrative it presents. At this stage, the Bus’ activism 
begins emphasising its narrative more heavily, with the focus of its activism 
firmly rooted with its international audience in mind. 
 The Freedom Bus features a third, international audience for its activism 
that is granted much greater proximity to its practical action. Whilst the Bus has 
a base crew that runs the Rides and carries out the playback theatre 
performances, the Bus also invites international participants to partake. The 
Freedom Bus consistently advertised available places ahead of their yearly 
Rides, asking participants to make payments to help fund the Ride.298 The Bus 
brought in these international riders with the intent to gather “internationals and 
Palestinians who come to learn from and engage in solidarity actions with 
community members.”299 In this sense, these foreign participants are present as 
an audience for the Freedom Bus’ activism; the Bus aims to change their hearts 
and minds, so that they can return to their normal lives with a newfound 
solidarity with the Palestinian cause, to help advocate in their own countries. 
The Freedom Bus, considered through this lens, becomes a tool for connection 
and communication, or networking. The bus, as a vehicle, has already been 
covered as a site of resistance and conflict in Israel-Palestine. There is a sense 
that the presence of vehicles like the Freedom Bus in the occupied territories, 
as tools for unity and mobilisation, equates to resistance. Along these lines, 
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there have been parallels drawn between these Palestinian acts of resistance 
and the bus rides of the US Civil Rights Movement of the mid-Twentieth 
Century, especially as a source of inspiration. Griffin relates that: 
On 15 November 2011, fifty years after the iconic freedom Rides of the 
US civil rights movement began, a group of six Palestinian activists 
mounted their own anti-segregation protest using the same name. They 
set out to board segregated “Jewish-only” buses that connect Israeli 
settlements in the West Bank to occupied East Jerusalem.300 
These riders were explicit in their Civil Rights analogies and their purpose was 
to highlight the racial inequality and segregation present in the illegal Israeli 
occupation, but muted in the Israeli narrative.301 The Freedom Bus itself was 
explicitly “inspired by the Freedom Rides of 1961 in the USA, which saw civil 
rights activists travel through Southern states challenging segregation, and the 
Australian Freedom Rides of 1964 and ’65, which raised the issue of indigenous 
rights,” referring to these as a “radical inheritance.”302 According to Derek 
Charles Catsam, the US Freedom Rides: 
Quite literally took the Civil Rights Movement national, transforming it 
from a phenomenon of isolated events creating crises from place to 
place – here Little Rock, there Montgomery’s bus boycott, somewhere 
else protests against a lynching. Freedom Riders, whether known as 
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such formally or not, went from one place to another, connecting 
communities, pulling the discrete pods of resistance together.303 
The purpose of the US Freedom Rides was thus to create a sense of 
commonality and larger political upheaval; not to necessarily lead political 
action, but to help draw these actions under a single umbrella. The Freedom 
Bus serves a similar purpose, drawing together the common experiences of 
different Palestinian communities as a counter to the fragmentation of 
Palestinian land and peoples by the Israelis. The people riding the busses 
become an integral part of the vehicle’s activism; it is the responsibility of the 
riders to create the connections between isolated events and communities, 
forming the wider movement. 
To do this, the riders must also be educated as to the issues and wider 
phenomena facing the oppressed. By Griffin’s measure, the Palestinian 
Freedom Bus follows a similar direction, “transport[ing] West Bank residents 
and international allies together to places in which they can get a clearer 
understanding of occupied life and begin to practice the many faces of 
freedom.”304 Through its recordings of its daily activities during its Rides, the 
Bus certainly gives this impression. In a broad sense, the Bus outlined that “at 
the heart of all Freedom Bus activities is the belief that community engagement, 
active solidarity and creative expression are vital in the journey towards a more 
just, peaceful and egalitarian world.”305 Its overarching ethos places importance 
on active engagement with those living under the Israeli occupation as a means 
of promoting support and fostering change. The Freedom Bus blog also often 
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featured a conclusive post at the end of the year’s Ride, and these highlight the 
significance the Bus saw in educating and encouraging solidarity with its 
participants. In 2014, the Bus celebrated the inspiration that the Ride instilled to 
go forward and continue their advocacy: 
Everyone leaves inspired and strengthened by the unique and life-
changing experience that is the Freedom Ride. Palestine is in all our 
hearts! . . . This year’s Freedom Ride may be over but the Freedom 
Family will live on! . . . 
The injustices that I have witnessed with my own eyes is at times too 
catastrophic to explain, but I know I will do my best. My hope is that I will 
bring this truth home with me and share it [with] everyone and anyone I 
come into contact with. I will carry this truth with me wherever I go.306 
In focussing on the change in the minds of the participants in its conclusion, the 
Bus places implicit significance on this as almost the purpose of its Ride. The 
2016 Ride especially emphasised the responsibility it bestowed upon its 
participants to commit to Palestinian activism, share what they had witnessed 
and further solidarity: 
Throughout the ride participants were armed with stories of love and 
resistance, each departing with a new responsibility to spread these 
truths abroad. The power carried by our experiences is immense . . . By 
bearing witness and standing in solidarity with those in struggle, we are 
now better equipped to change the hearts and minds of our friends, 
families and societies at home. Through articles, film screenings, photo 
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exhibitions, participation in Palestine solidarity committees, and 
organising in the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions Movement, we are 
now more committed than ever to furthering our solidarities with 
Palestinians.307 
The Rides become a means of creating and recruiting new activists, to return to 
their own lives and advocate for the Palestinian cause. The role of the Freedom 
Bus is then to produce these activists, to invite people with the interest in 
participating and train them in Palestinian cultural resistance. 
In some sense, the Rides effectively offer international participants a tourism 
opportunity that also allows them to engage in activism. The Freedom Bus, in 
advertising these Rides, employs language that emphasises the travel 
opportunity they provide – for instance, writing in 2014 that: 
We can assure you that if you are part of this year’s group, you are in for 
a special treat. Different activities, walks through breath-taking 
landscapes, work with local communities and children, cultural events in 
the evenings that will make you want to never leave this country again… 
It all adds up to a memorable and unique stay here in beautiful Palestine 
– and what better way to learn about the impacts of apartheid and 
occupation than to actively contribute to putting an end to them? The 
souvenir you will take with you will be the smiles you are bound to put on 
children’s faces, the unforgettable stories and fates shared during our 
playback theatre performances and the great new friends you will make 
for life. 
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Ready for it? We can’t wait to welcome you here in the refugee camp of 
Jenin to prepare for what we already know will be an epic journey of 
discovery. Welcome onboard the Freedom Bus!308 
In advertising the Ride, the Bus emphasises the experience and memories it will 
provide its participants, with the added learning about the crimes of the Israeli 
occupation. The Bus sells the trip as though the international participants are 
potential customers. Anna de Jong points out that, despite the presentation of 
tourism as antithetical to activism – with tourism dependent on “quiet, solitary 
environments” and activism as “necessarily radical, overt and controversial” – 
travel provides activists with an opportunity to perform their version of activism 
as part of a negotiation of varying spaces.309 The Freedom Bus deviates from 
this insofar as they determine themselves what activism is to be performed, 
rather than the international participants, who instead sign on to this itinerary.310 
However, the Rides certainly allow the Bus activists and participants to engage 
in their style of cultural activism outside the Freedom Theatre’s usual confines 
and negotiate the highly-controlled spaces within the Israeli occupation. The 
international participants are almost brought on as “helping hands” and 
additional witnesses who can spread the information in different circles. De 
Jong also highlights that events “play a critical, but under-recognised, role 
longer term, beyond their time-frame” that allow instances like the Freedom Bus 
Rides to have wider-reaching effects beyond their “spatial and temporal 
 
308 The Freedom Bus, ‘Another Community Visit’, Freedom Bus: Ride for Justice (2014) 
<https://freedombuspalestine.wordpress.com/2014/03/03/another-community-visit/> [Accessed 
26th August 2021]. 
309 Anna de Jong, ‘Rethinking Activism: Tourism, Mobilities and Emotion’, Social & Cultural 
Geography, 18.6 (2016), 851-868, pp.865-866. 
310 The Freedom Bus, ‘Another Community Visit’; The Freedom Bus, ‘Join the Freedom Ride’s 
Cultural Events!’, Freedom Bus: Ride for Justice (2015) 
<https://freedombuspalestine.wordpress.com/2015/02/24/28280/> [Accessed 26th August 2021]. 
131 
 
confines.”311 Furthermore, the knowledge, interest and connections developed 
during a volunteer tourism experience significantly influence participants’ 
involvement in (global) social movements, demonstrating an effectiveness in the 
Freedom Bus’ focus on mobilising its participants.312 Alongside its explicit 
audiences of local Palestinian communities and its international online readers, 
the Freedom Bus sees a third, implicit audience that effectively straddles the 
two, both working to support the local and online performances, and equally 
learning about the Israeli occupation and Palestinian activism from the Bus 
itself. Whilst supporting the practical activism of the Freedom Bus, these 
participants are equally being instilled with the narrative it produces; the Bus 
emphasises practical action with these participants, whilst simultaneously 
requiring its narrative to inform them as to why they are participating at all. 
 
Broader Trends in Palestinian Activism 
The Freedom Bus is not only beholden to its own agency and form of 
activism, however, as it also operates within a wider movement of Palestinian 
resistance. With a broad variety of possible actions to promote Palestinian 
resistance and challenge the Israeli occupation, a generalised, theoretical 
sense of what Palestinian activism should attempt to accomplish emerges to 
coordinate action and direct these efforts effectively. The general perspective 
stresses the importance of highlighting the actions of the Israeli regime and, 
ultimately, ending the occupation, especially as it becomes apparent Israel has 
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no intention of so much as halting its Zionist programme.313 For creative-based 
activism specifically, there is an attitude that it should be demonstrative of the 
impact of the Israeli occupation. Madalena Santos, in her work on narrative and 
the Freedom Theatre, argues that “Palestinian creative resistance works to 
disrupt Zionist narratives to illustrate the continuous occupation, apartheid, and 
settler colonial practices of the state.”314 Creative works provide an insight into 
Israel-Palestine that makes clear the necessity in dismantling the Zionist 
narrative.315 At the same time, Palestinian creative resistance, according to 
Tahrir Hamdi, “entails writing, drawing, documenting the Palestinian narrative, 
creatively shaping a Palestinian experience that would be meaningful to the 
storyteller and his or her audience, and which would enable a mass witnessing 
of that experience” in order to retain the idea of “Palestine” in the minds of its 
people.316 In both senses, Palestinian creative activism is based around the 
notion of “bearing witness” – both as a way of highlighting Israeli injustices, and 
maintaining Palestinian identity and encouraging continued resistance. The 
emphasis is placed on narrative as a core facet of cultural activism, especially 
as a challenge to the Israeli narrative, rather than specific practical action. 
Chomsky and Pappé also emphasise the importance of help versus harm in 
carrying out activism on behalf of the Palestinians, however; it is not enough to 
act on behalf of Palestinians, but to do so in a way that is ethical and 
concrete.317 Chomsky argues that there are two key points to consider: “one, 
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what does it have to do with the policy of the state; how does it affect that? The 
other is, what about the audience here – at home [the US] – that you are trying 
to mobilise to become more active themselves, through civil disobedience and 
everything else?”318 In this sense, Palestinian activism also demands impactful, 
practical action that exerts some pressure on the Israeli occupation, as well as 
mobilising an (international) audience. These issues are covered by the 
Freedom Bus’ incorporation of multiple audiences, as it supports local 
Palestinian communities in their resistance whilst also employing these efforts 
to mobilise international supporters. Generalised theoretical concepts of what 
Palestinian activism should accomplish are still, however, situated around the 
notions of narrative and discourse, with action – whatever that entails – 
focussed on furthering the Palestinian narrative. 
Broader Palestinian activism is not only concerned with theoretical 
challenges to Israel, however, especially following twenty-first century trends 
that emphasise direct practical action. According to Griffin: 
Following popular disillusionment with the dissatisfying results of the 
Oslo Accords and their implementation (or lack thereof), Palestinian 
politics has turned to the populist organising of grassroots collectives. In 
fact, this shift represents a return to the strategies of the first Palestinian 
intifada, which was guided by the priorities of Palestinians living under 
occupation or in exile, including economic independence and 
opportunity.319 
Rather than being explicitly or exclusively concerned with challenging the Israeli 
narrative, more-recent trends have emphasised supporting Palestinians in the 
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practical challenges they face. Cultural activism – inherently concerned with 
narrative-based action – straddles the two, meaning groups such as the 
Freedom Bus must situate themselves within these broader, practically-minded 
networks of Palestinian activism. One of the most well-known, practically-based 
Palestinian resistance movements to emerge post-Oslo is the Boycott, 
Divestment and Sanctions movement (BDS). The Freedom Bus describes itself 
as “endorsed by the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions National Committee 
(BNC).”320 BDS aims to use practical pressure to achieve three goals regarding 
Israel’s violations of international law: 
1. Ending its occupation and colonisation of all Arab lands and dismantling 
the Wall 
2. Recognising the fundamental rights of the Arab-Palestinian citizens of 
Israel to full equality 
3. Respecting, protecting and promoting the rights of Palestinian refugees 
to return to their homes and properties as stipulated in UN Resolution 
194.321 
BDS employs three types of practical action to apply pressure to Israel: 
• BOYCOTTS involve withdrawing support from Israel's apartheid regime, 
complicit Israeli sporting, cultural and academic institutions, and from all 
Israeli and international companies engaged in violations of Palestinian 
human rights. 
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• DIVESTMENT campaigns urge banks, local councils, churches, pension 
funds and universities to withdraw investments from the State of Israel 
and all Israeli and international companies that sustain Israeli apartheid. 
• SANCTIONS campaigns pressure governments to fulfil their legal 
obligations to end Israeli apartheid, and not aid or assist its maintenance, 
by banning business with illegal Israeli settlements, ending military trade 
and free-trade agreements, as well as suspending Israel's membership in 
international forums such as UN bodies and FIFA.322 
Rather than explicitly arguing against the narrative created by Israel, BDS 
simply states that Israel is carrying out these particular actions and urges others 
to insist upon these broad, practical changes until Israeli stops, not arguing over 
Israel’s rationale behind their actions, but emphasising that they are illegal 
regardless. As such, Maia Carter Hallward quotes one activist as explaining 
“BDS is sort of a tactic and not a movement in and of itself; it’s a tactic in the 
larger Palestinian rights and antioccupation movement,” elaborating herself that, 
whilst it has bodies to help coordinate action, BDS does not represent a set of 
people deliberately committed to a single, shared identity or common, collective 
programme with a common purpose.323 It is something of an umbrella for 
unifying otherwise-disparate activist programmes. Such a focus – on targeted, 
economic action – appears far-removed from the cultural activities of the 
Freedom Bus, however. 
Although sharing BDS’ goals, the Freedom Bus does not pursue these through 
the practical actions BDS lays out, rather educating people in the issues facing 
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Palestinians. In some sense, however, the Bus provides the context for and 
justifies BDS’ activism. BDS’ goals, whilst not concerned with countering Israeli 
narratives, are derived from the notions of the dominant Palestinian narrative, 
referring to the “colonisation” of Palestinian land and the right of return, for 
instance. Along these lines, BDS is tangentially involved in promoting the 
dominant Palestinian narrative. Hallward quotes BDS-era activists as “signifying 
agents actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for 
constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or observers. They are deeply 
embroiled . . . in what has been referred to as ‘the politics of signification,’” 
adding that their primary function is to reframe Israeli-Palestinian discourse and 
challenge Israeli’s moral authority.324 BDS is not itself, however, a producer of 
these narratives; it carries out practical activism whilst relying on existing 
narratives to educate its supporters as to why they are taking this action and 
what its intended impact is. Cultural activist programmes such as the Freedom 
Bus thus play a supporting role for these broader trends, helping mobilise new 
activists, who can then direct their efforts into practical actions such as BDS. 
The discourse is reframed in these more-recent trends, as activists are not 
trying to convince Israel of their wrongs, but rather demonstrate those wrongs to 
potential supporters. Chomsky recognises this in a growing “circling the wagons 
mentality” within Israel – seen in the late stages of South African Apartheid as 
well – as international pressure grows against them.325 Narrative remains an 
important tool, but it is applied differently; broader trends in Palestinian activism 
instead emphasise effective, practical action as the core. The Freedom Bus, 
within this wider context, straddles the two, carrying out practical action that 
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supports Palestinian communities whilst also concerned with creating and 
disseminating a Palestinian narrative to challenge the rationales of the Israeli 
occupation. As part of broader Palestinian activism and the notions of what this 
activism should accomplish, the Freedom Bus plays the role of a mobiliser, 
educating others as a way of promoting solidarity and creating new activists in 
support of Palestine – as it sets out to do so, it bears witness, raises awareness 
and builds alliances. 
 
Conclusion 
Overall, the narrative the Freedom Bus creates and distributes does not 
exist as its own entity; it is inherently tied to the activism and practical action the 
Bus carries out, and it exists within wider trends of Palestinian activism and 
resistance. With the Bus’ goals boiling down to witnessing and raising 
awareness of the Palestinian experience, the narrative and the online platform 
through which it is delivered are a part of its advocacy, aimed more towards the 
international audience. This advocacy is, itself, a part of and the next step on 
from its efforts to support local Palestinian communities, as it disseminates the 
individual Palestinian testimonies it collects to help highlight the patterns of 
oppression enacted by Israel – both as a means of emphasising a commonality 
and collective identity between Palestinians, and to garner international support 
for these resistance efforts. These notions suggest that the Freedom Bus’ 
activism is primarily focussed on practical action and intended to serve the 
Palestinian communities it visits during its Rides. However, the Freedom Bus 
equally targets its action towards its international audiences – both online and 
with its participants – consciously employing its activism as a means of 
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educating potential supporters of the Palestinian cause and encouraging 
solidarity. Here, the Bus uses narrative to present a comprehensive and 
digestible introduction to the issues facing Palestine, both to educate and 
mobilise, but also to emphasise the necessity of their activism. Thus, narrative, 
whilst not the core of the Freedom Bus’ activism, plays a crucial role as a 
means of communication that enhances the effectiveness of their efforts. The 
presence of this narrative also helps the Freedom Bus, a culturally-orientated 
programme, situate itself within and contribute to wider Palestinian activism, as 
contemporary activist trends rather emphasise practical action that directly 
pressures Israel. The Bus serves to contextualise the action that is taking place 
as a means to educate and mobilise international audiences, who can then 
channel their support into accessible tactics, such as BDS. Fundamentally, the 
Freedom Bus does not narrate for itself, or for the sake of presenting a 
Palestinian narrative, but rather employs its narrative as a means of furthering 
Palestinian activism. Such a notion is crucial to understanding trends in 
contemporary Israeli-Palestinian discourse. The purpose of Palestinian 
narration has moved away from arguing the rights of Palestine against Israel 
and its supporters, as in the time of ‘Permission to Narrate,’ towards supporting 






 In resisting destruction and erasure, it has been long-acknowledged that 
Palestinians have needed to narrate their own perspective of the Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict and have that narrative heard. In theoretically-based 
discourse, the issue is often presented in abstract as an argument between two 
different sides – both arguments are presented and contrasted. However, in 
reporting events on the ground, it is much-better recognised that Palestinians 
are an oppressed group; it is known that Israel has enacted apartheid policies 
and continues to annex Palestinian land, frequently carries out violence against 
Palestinians, weakens Palestinian societal structures, and destroys the means 
for Palestinians to make themselves heard. There is an evident dissonance in 
these two perspectives and approaches. Contextualising the Palestinians’ need 
to narrate within the restrictive reality on the ground opens up the issue to 
demonstrate that, even as Palestinians are presenting their own narrative, there 
are very real hurdles to overcome in order to do this, both within the theoretical 
discourse and in having to physically navigate the Israeli occupation. 
The Freedom Theatre and Freedom Bus, as non-dominant Palestinian activists, 
demonstrate clearly the difficulties in narrating and advocating for Palestinians, 
both in challenging Israel and in presenting a perspective that, to some extent, 
deviates from the homogeneity of the dominant Palestinian narrative. The 
activists’ narrative – one that stemmed ultimately from the personal experiences 
of the Mer Khamis, rather than the paradigms and arguments of the dominant 
discourse – had to carve out its own space between the restrictive domination 
of Israel’s Conflict-led narrative; the expectations of Palestinian society, 
activism, and discourse; the limitations and influences of operating within a 
country controlled and fragmented by occupation; and the changing 
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requirements of Palestinian attention and action, as the Conflict progresses and 
new contexts emerge. What the Freedom Theatre especially demonstrated was 
the inevitability of, or perhaps the necessity in, that narrative adapting over time. 
For those narrating from within Israel-Palestine, sharing Palestinian experiences 
is inextricably undivorceable from living them, and considering this when 
approaching the narrative discourse allows us to appreciate the significance the 
Israeli occupation has as both a subject of and an influence on Palestinian 
narratives. The Freedom Theatre recognised this in its “Cultural Intifada” and its 
efforts to free the “occupation of the mind;” however, the Theatre was itself 
subject to these same influences, as the reality surrounding it informed its 
perception and presentation of the contexts it created and was subject to. It is 
not as simple as creating a documentary, performing plays, visiting 
communities, advocating online – sharing a narrative. The Freedom Theatre 
and Bus demonstrates that it takes sustained effort and, occasionally, sacrifice. 
 This thesis offers the opportunity to develop our understanding of 
narrative discourse, history-telling and activism, particularly within Israel-
Palestine – although such phenomena are certainly relevant in other historical 
contexts. Taking a critical approach to the underlying paradigms and means 
through which a history is told – especially when approaching these histories as 
subjective narratives – provides us with a clearer view of the driving 
assumptions and ideologies of a history, both as a means for better 
understanding historiography and discourse, and in interpreting real-world 
events and actions. Along these lines, utilising the concept of canons in 
histories and narratives develops this further, especially as a means of realising 
and emphasising what parts of a history are included or omitted, and for what 
reason. Activism, as something of an intent behind some narratives and 
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histories, can also be more-deeply analysed through this thesis’ methodology, 
especially as a means for interpreting the purpose behind its approach and its 
place in the existing discourse. Equally, touching on subjects such as media 
studies, theatre studies, aesthetics and materiality, this thesis can also present 
some avenues for further exploration in our approach to the Israeli-Palestinian 
Conflict. These specific approaches allow us to go further in our analysis by 
considering particular facets of the Conflict, which might otherwise be 
overlooked, and combine them to form a more-complete picture. These 
approaches equally allow us to consider the means through which the Conflict 
is recorded, told and perpetuated. 
There were, ultimately, limitations in the scope of the work here due to the 
constraints of the thesis and, as such, there exist opportunities for further 
research. For the Freedom Theatre and Bus specifically, although this thesis 
only intended to utilise its online and media outputs, access to a greater pool of 
sources would grant us the opportunity to corroborate the narrative present in 
its online outputs and paint a more comprehensive picture of the activist group 
overall. There is also scope to make contact with the Freedom Theatre/Bus and 
gain the present perspective of those who were involved at the time, to gain 
their insight in hindsight into the events covered here and learn more about their 
activities post-2016. More generally, whilst a close-reading case study approach 
provides for a much deeper insight into the nuances of a Palestinian narrator, 
further research into other activist groups and actors in the Israeli-Palestinian 
Conflict could provide us with a more-comprehensive picture of the nuances of 
both Israeli and Palestinian narratives of the Conflict, as well identify general 
trends in Israeli and Palestinian activism and advocacy. Further research into 
activism will also provide us with a better sense of the development of the 
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Conflict, as the status quo amongst the dominant actors remains and change is 
increasingly driven from the grassroots. 
 The Freedom Theatre shows us the efforts Palestinians are continuing to 
make to narrate their own history and have their voices heard, and the 
effectiveness of cultural resistance in combatting the Israeli occupation. In a 
system intended to quash the Palestinian spirit and drive them out of their land, 
continuous resistance that emphasises Palestinian agency becomes an 
effective tool in countering those efforts. Ultimately, we cannot only play 
attention when violence escalates – when Israel launches another “operation” 
into Gaza – and criticise these overt instances when the regular, muted violence 
of the Israeli occupation continues day-to-day. The need for Palestinians to 
narrate becomes apparent when Israel launches a war into Lebanon or an 
assault into Palestine; however, as this thesis makes clear, Palestinians are 
narrating even outside of these flare-ups and continue to do so against 
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